The Next Hurrah

A Brilliant Case Officer

by emptywheel

There's an amusing line in Jonathan Landay's article on the Bush Administration's discovery that Vladimir Putin has no soul.

Bush and his aides "grossly misjudged Putin," considering him "a good guy and one of us," said Michael McFaul of Stanford University's Hoover Institution.

The former KGB officer created that illusion partly by appearing to share Bush's political and religious convictions, standard tradecraft employed by intelligence officers to recruit spies, he said.

"Putin . . . is a brilliant case officer," said Carlos Pasqual, a former senior State Department official now at The Brookings Institution, a center-left policy organization in Washington.

What many experts regard as the real Putin — a hard-line, derisive Russian nationalist — was on display Friday as he greeted visiting Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates ahead of talks that failed to break the impasses over missile defense and other key security issues.

After keeping the U.S. officials waiting for 40 minutes, Putin mocked their mission in front of reporters and television cameras. [my emphasis]

The suggestion, of course, is that wily Vladimir fooled the poor unsuspecting Bush cronies by misrepresenting who he was.

It's a nice excuse, I guess. But IMO there is nothing that Putin is currently doing that isn't utterly consistent with who he was in 2001, when Bush looking into his soul. What has changed is not Putin's willingness to display his real personality. What has changed is the power dynamic in the relationship. In 2001, oil was cheap and Russia was weak. In later 2001, Putin recognized that the war on terror offered a remarkable opportunity to legitimize his Chechnya campaign, at least in some corners of the Western world. But as the Bush Administration tried to morph the war on terror into the "war to sustain our hegemony by dominating the Middle East" (at the expense of Russian relations with Iraq and the potential expense of Russian cooperation agreements on various issues with Iran), Russia no longer had an interest in playing along. Oh, and did I mention that Bush's Middle Eastern war contributed to record oil prices, which served as a springboard for Putin's resurgent authoritarianism?

So it wasn't so much that Putin hid his true nature. Rather, it's that the Bushies saw what they wanted to see, without bothering to inquire what was lurking beyond the view immediately in front of their face.

What's that thing nature abhors, again?

by Kagro X

Via Crooks and Liars, there's video available of Sy Hersh's appearance on CNN's Late Edition today, in which he discusses his latest article for The New Yorker.

The gist of Hersh's comments on CNN? That changing the "mission" with regard to Iran makes an attack more palatable to the American public. Instead of the failed smoking gun/mushroom cloud line...

Hersh: You can also sell counter-terror, it’s much more logical. You can say to the American people, we’re only hitting these people that are trying to kill our boys and the coalition forces and so that seems to be more sensible, The White House think s they can actually pitch this, this would actually work…

By all rights, though, the "administration" shouldn't be able to get away with this one, either. Iranian "meddling" in Iraq was as foreseeable and as obvious and likely an outcome as the post-invasion looting and a sustained anti-occupation insurgency, both of which the war cheerleaders claim to have been unable to predict.

Purely from a force protection perspective, isn't it a spectacular failing to have our troops falling prey to Iranian interference at this stage of the game? And pretending it's a surprise?

Just another day in Republican Bizarro World.

Afri ... um EuroAfriCom

by emptywheel

Scout prime has been tracking something I've been watching, too. The new AfriCom military command? Well, the entire continent of Africa has told us, "no, thanks."

The Pentagon's plan to create a US military command based in Africa have hit a wall of hostility from governments in the region reluctant to associate themselves with the Bush administration's "war on terror" and fearful of American intervention.

A US delegation led by Ryan Henry, principal deputy under-secretary of defence for policy, returned to Washington last week with little to show for consultations with defence and foreign ministry officials in Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Djibouti and with the African Union (AU). An earlier round of consultations with sub-Saharan countries on providing secure facilities and local back-up for the new command, to be known as Africom and due to be operational by September next year, was similarly inconclusive.

The Libyan and Algerian governments reportedly told Mr Henry that they would play no part in hosting Africom. Despite recently improved relations with the US, both said they would urge their neighbours not to do so, either. Even Morocco, considered Washington's closest north African ally, indicated it did not welcome a permanent military presence on its soil.

"We've got a big image problem down there," a state department official admitted. "Public opinion is really against getting into bed with the US. They just don't trust the US."

The article cites public opinion and the desire to avoid building obvious terrorist targets in their countries. But I suspect two more things are at work, too. We're not going to establish an AfriCom headquarters without negotiating an agreement with the host country that gives our soldiers some immunity from local law enforcement, gives us a big financial bonus for establishing the headquarters, and a whole bunch of other goodies. (Read Chalmers Johnson's Nemesis if you're interested--here's a taste.) Once upon a time, such an arrangement was a good acceptable deal for the host country because, well, the US was the uncontested hegemon of the world.

But now, particularly in Africa (where Hu Jintao has been very busy making friends in recent years), that's no longer true. So I suspect that, when faced with the opportunity to cede a good deal of sovereignty so the US' cowboys can come in and push local folks around, that doesn't look like such a great deal anymore.

Who Owns the UN's Computer Systems?

by emptywheel

Via ThinkProgress, USA Today reports that the cheat sheet for Bush's speech got placed on the UN website today.

Apparently, a marked-up draft of the president's speech popped up on the U.N.'s website as President Bush delivered his remarks this morning before the General Assembly, USA TODAY's David Jackson reports. The draft included phonetic spellings of some names and countries, and the cellphone numbers for Bush speechwriters.

Press secretary Dana Perino downplayed the incident, and said phonetic spellings are used to help interpreters. Asked if the president has trouble pronouncing some country's names, Perino deemed it "an offensive question."

"There was an error made," Perino said, noting it was not a final draft.

"It was taken down and there's nothing more to say about it."

Apparently, Bush spent his time with Sarkozy in Maine drunk or something, because the French President's name is one of the ones included in Bush's pronunciation guide.

• Kyrgyzstan [KEYR-geez-stan]
• Mauritania [moor-EH-tain-ee-a]
• Harare [hah-RAR-ray]
• Mugabe [moo-GAH-bee]
• Sarkozy [sar-KO-zee]
• Caracas [kah-RAH-kus]

Now, Dana Peroxide says it was a mistake. But I'm reminded of another little technical gaffe that Bush had once at the UN. In September 2002, after Powell and Blair (on one side) and Cheney and Rummy (on the other) had been arguing for a month over whether Bush should call for a UN resolution on Iraq or whether the US should just bypass the UN process altogether. In the end, Bush agreed to include a call for a new resolution. But mysteriously, when Bush read the speech from the teleprompter, that line had been removed. From Woodward's Plan of Attack:

The Israeli Bombing Run in Syria

by emptywheel

Glenn Kessler and Robin Wright have the most comprehensive story, to date, on the mysterious bombing run Israel did in Syria on September 6. They confirm the story that had been floating around--that Israel's target was a suspected nuclear site, supplied by North Korea. The story is interesting mostly for the exchange of intelligence it portrays. The Israelis first came with intelligence, yet Bush was chill to the attack.

Israel's decision to attack Syria on Sept. 6, bombing a suspected nuclear site set up in apparent collaboration with North Korea, came after Israel shared intelligence with President Bush this summer indicating that North Korean nuclear personnel were in Syria, U.S. government sources said.

The Bush administration has not commented on the Israeli raid or the underlying intelligence. Although the administration was deeply troubled by Israel's assertion that North Korea was assisting the nuclear ambitions of a country closely linked with Iran, sources said, the White House opted against an immediate response because of concerns it would undermine long-running negotiations aimed at persuading North Korea to abandon its nuclear program.

But then the US corroborated the Israeli intelligence, and the attack went forward.

Ultimately, however, the United States is believed to have provided Israel with some corroboration of the original intelligence before Israel proceeded with the raid, which hit the Syrian facility in the dead of night to minimize possible casualties, the sources said.

The article raises doubts about the quality of the Israeli intelligence (and who knows whether our intelligence--supposedly used to corroborate the Israeli intelligence--has gotten any better since the Iraq debacle).

The quality of the Israeli intelligence, the extent of North Korean assistance and the seriousness of the Syrian effort are uncertain, raising the possibility that North Korea was merely unloading items it no longer needed.

Something's still stinky about this raid. The creepy silence on all parts suggests there was some there there--but perhaps not what Israel claimed it was. I'm actually wondering whether it doesn't involve a fifth player--perhaps China--that no one is talking about.

 

Bush Administration Only Understands Its Own Propaganda

By DHinMI

Apparently the Bush administration only understands their own domestic propaganda:

President George W. Bush's homeland security adviser said on Sunday al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden is "virtually impotent" and can do little more than send videotaped messages.

Top White House aide Fran Townsend said U.S. officials were studying bin Laden's new video tape for clues to his health or whereabouts, and whether there were any hidden meanings or messages.

But she said there was no sign of an imminent attack.

"This is a man on the run in a cave who is virtually impotent other than his ability to get these messages out," Townsend said on CNN's "Late Edition." "It is propaganda.

"Based on our experience, we have never seen bin Laden use a tape to trigger any operational activity."

Then why did Condi tell the networks not to air his tapes?:

MR. FLEISCHER: Yes. Dr. Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor, this morning called a group of network executives to raise their awareness about national security concerns of airing pre-recorded, pre-taped messages from Osama bin Laden that could be a signal to terrorists to incite attacks.

It was a very collegial conversation. At best, Osama bin Laden's message is propaganda, calling on people to kill Americans. At worst, he could be issuing orders to his followers to initiate such attacks.

Townsend in right in one important respect: Bin Laden’s communiqués are propaganda.  But they’re propaganda that needs to be taken seriously, and our actions and our own efforts at shaping public opinion in the rest of the world need to be improved.  The terrorist’s credo of the propoganda of the deed is about sending a message.  The more dramatic the message AND the delivery, the more effective the terrorist will be.  As terrorism expert Brian Jenkins succinctly put it, "terrorism is theater."  Al Qaeda obviously understands this, and is adapting this dictum to the information age:

Anbar: Not a Success, and Irrelevant to the "Surge"

by DHinMI

Commander guy is making a big deal about the supposed "success" of the surge in Anbar Province.  Sure, he dropped by a film set remote military base in the vast desert that makes up most of Anbar, and tried to claim that the surge was connected to the apparent defeat of Al Qaeda in Anbar:

You see Sunnis who once fought side by side with al Qaeda against coalition troops now fighting side by side with coalition troops against al Qaeda. Anbar is a huge province. It was once written off as lost. It is now one of the safest places in Iraq. (Hooah.) Because of your hard work, because of your bravery and sacrifice, you are denying al Qaeda a safe haven from which to plot and plan and carry out attacks against the United States of America. What you're doing here is making this country safer, and I thank you for your hard work. (Hooah.)

The surge of operations that began in June is improving security throughout Iraq. The military successes are paving the way for the political reconciliation and economic progress the Iraqis need to transform their country...

Earlier today I met with some of the tribal sheiks here in Anbar. It was a really interesting meeting. And at the table were the leaders of the central government, as well. They told me that the kind of bottom-up progress that your efforts are bringing to Anbar is vital to the success and stability of a free Iraq.

Almost everything in this statement is a lie.

Is War With Iran Imminent?

By Mimikatz

Being more or less an optimist by nature, I am generally skeptical of the stories that periodically surface claiming that we are months, weeks or even days away from war with Iran, given how insane it would be on so many levels.  But the new spate of stories has me worried.

Evidently they began with a directive sent by Vice President Cheney to various neocon think tanks to begin drumming up support for the war.  Via George Packer,

They [the source’s institution] have “instructions” (yes, that was the word used) from the Office of the Vice-President to roll out a campaign for war with Iran in the week after Labor Day; it will be coordinated with the American Enterprise Institute, the Wall Street Journal, the Weekly Standard, Commentary, Fox, and the usual suspects. It will be heavy sustained assault on the airwaves, designed to knock public sentiment into a position from which a war can be maintained.

Evidently 35-40% support is deemed to be enough--that would be the 25% of the population who are Bushbots (including the neocons) and  5-10% who either profit from war or who just think things going boom is cool.

Spencer Ackerman finds a connection between our embrace of new BFFs the Sunni tribal leaders and former insurgents and the talk of war with Iran.  These same Sunnis warned the US in 2005 that elections would deliver the country to Iran.  Is the increased support for the Sunnis and the undermining of Prime Minister Maliki a harbinger of a switch in who we are really backing?  Was that part of the subtext of Bush's surprise visit to Anbar?  After all, in the view of Reuel Marc Gerecht, it is the Shi'a militias, particularly the Mahdi Army, and their Iranian suppliers, who are now responsible for most American deaths.  Best we teach those pesky Iranians a lesson now.

Ackerman sees the Cheney-led campaign as directed as much at the Pentagon as the American public.

Cheney's likely motivation for issuing such instructions to his think-tank allies would be to win an inter-administration battle over the future of Iran policy. Cheney, an advocate of confronting the Iranians militarily, faces opposition from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where the primary concern is preventing an open-ended Iraq commitment from decimating military preparedness for additional crises. A new war is the last thing the chiefs want, and on this, they're backed by Defense Secretary Bob Gates.

This theory makes war with Iran much less likely, except for one thing--The Decider.  Of all the people who seem to really get off on war, Bush has to be the head cheerleader.  And he does have a record of not listening to his generals, like Eric Shinseki.  And we know he really likes kicking (Muslim) ass.  In fact, showing them just how tough we really are is, to me, the most plausible reason for the misbegotten and mismanaged war we are still mired in.

The shakiness of the financial markets had seemed to me to argue against war with Iran, since the economic implications of war (increase in oil prices, possible damage to oil fields leading to even higher prices, China gets involved on some economic front,  stock market goes down, debt goes up, etc)  would seem to exacerbate most if not all of the problems we have now.  But The Cunning Realist thinks that events in the global finacial markets related to the packaging and selling of subprime mortgages make war with Iran more, not less, likely.  I'd like to see this theory elaborated.

In any event, if it comes to that we know that Bush doesn't think he has to ask permission to start a war.  He's the Commander-in-Chief!  And there's always the Authorization for Unlimited Military Force (that was the name, wasn't it?)  passed after 9/11 that gives him Congress' blessing.  Declaring the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to be terrorists and blaming all the weapons in Iraq (that aren't ones we gave the Iraqi Army) on them provides the provocation.  If more is needed, it can be manufactured.

So now I'm worried again.  What do you folks think?

"Who Lost Iraq?"

by DemFromCT

That's the question James Dobbins asks in his intriguing article in Foreign Affairs (full article here at RCP). Dobbins served in both the Clinton and Bush II administrations, and takes a dim view of finger pointing, including at the military brass and the press.

Given the lack of receptivity to alternative views at the top, how much blame should be shouldered by people lower down who knew better and failed to speak up or who spoke up but failed to resign when their objections were brushed aside? Should the generals who revolted be condemned for awaiting retirement to lodge their protests? Should the nation foster a more critical climate within its military services, one in which officers are encouraged to challenge not only illegal orders but unwise ones as well?

Probably not. The military demands a higher degree of subordination, obedience, and discipline than other professions. Furthermore, civilian control of the military is an inviolable principle, which means that civilians should bear the chief responsibility when the military is misdirected.

If it is not the military's role to challenge lawful orders, still less is it the role of the press to manufacture controversy where none exists. In a democracy, the primary responsibility for opposing or at least critically examining the case for war falls on the opposition party. If the opposition chooses to duck that responsibility, as the Democrats largely did when the issue was put to them in late 2002, it is hard to fault the press for not stepping in to fill the void.

While refraining from criticizing individuals, there are suggestions for reforming institutions.

For the past 15 years, critical functions such as overseeing military and police training, providing humanitarian and reconstruction aid, and promoting democratic development have been repeatedly transferred from the State Department to the Defense Department and back again, leaving each agency uncertain what its long-term responsibilities are and consequently disinclined to invest in improving its performance. An executive order defining such roles, as Gates has proposed, would probably not outlast the administration that issued it. The national security establishment thus needs a legislated reorganization so that it can better conduct postwar stabilization and reconstruction missions, just as the Goldwater-Nichols Act over 20 years ago reorganized the military establishment to more effectively wage war.

Recognizing terror as predominantly criminal, and preemption as having failed, Dobbins suggests

The "war on terror" should be reconceived and renamed to place greater emphasis on its police, intelligence, and diplomatic components. The U.S. Army should continue to improve its counterinsurgency skills, with a particular emphasis on training, equipping, and advising others to conduct such campaigns. The United States should avoid allowing al Qaeda and its ilk to dictate its alignment in any particular dispute, should take sides when necessary based on an objective calculation of national interests, and should directly engage U.S. troops in local civil wars only in the rarest of circumstances. "Preemption" should be retired from the lexicon of declared policy, democratization should be pursued everywhere as a long-term objective in full recognition of its short-term costs and risks, and nation building should be embarked on only where the United States and its partners are ready for a long, hard, and expensive effort.

But perhaps one of the more fascinating points made is the willingness to lay out this concept:

Above all, Americans should accept that the entire nation has, to one degree or another, failed in Iraq. Facing up to this fact and drawing the necessary lessons is the only way to ensure that it does not similarly fail again.

He's not the only analyst or pundit willing to stand up to the scare tactics of the neocons and call it as he sees it. Jim Hoagland in the WaPo wrote this:

For Americans, the most important comparison will be this one: As Vietnam did, Iraq has become a failure even on its own terms -- whatever those terms are at any given moment.

This whole idea of pushing "victory" and "success" while avoiding "defeat" and "failure" when it occurs has become a staple of WH and their allies' rhetoric. For that reason, it's always interesting to see the terms "defeat" and "failure" used by pundits, despite the intimidation tactics used by the Republicans (while they insist "defeat is not an option", as if we could blithely choose our realities, here's use of the word by Ignatius: "While the Iraq part of the story still has to play itself out, the new approach isn't premised on success there but the possibility of failure.") Of course, that's not news to the American people.

Most people in the United States believe the coalition effort will be recalled in a negative light in the future, according to a poll by Rasmussen Reports. 57 per cent of respondents think the mission in Iraq will be seen as a failure in the long run, while 29 per cent think the war will be deemed a success (related Rasmussen poll here)

It suggests that the public, usually ahead of the pundits and always ahead of the politicians, isn't alone any more. And thinking through what to do next so as not to repeat the mistakes of Iraq, as Dobbins attempts to do, is a worthy goal. However, it does require a careful look at future ventures.

Preemption, democracy promotion, and nation building have all been sullied by association with the war in Iraq. All three policies deserve reexamination, but none should be jettisoned entirely.

That's controversial enough without WH intimidation to avoid thinking through the consequences of failure.

Certainly, reevaluation of the reality of the Iraq situation is called for. Part of that reality is that only political pressure will make that happen. As Dobbins points out, it takes Democrats to make that happen. And September, after all, is only a week away.

The NIE: Iraq to Split in Three States

by emptywheel

Okay, that's not precisely the conclusion the new NIE in Iraq draws. But it is the logical outcome of the key judgments its gives. Here are some key points, taken totally out of the context of the report, but which are otherwise direct quotes:

• The IC assesses that the emergence of “bottom-up” security initiatives, principally among Sunni Arabs and focused on combating AQI, represent the best prospect for improved security over the next six to 12 months, but we judge these initiatives will only translate into widespread political accommodation and enduring stability if the Iraqi Government accepts and supports them. A multi-stage process involving the Iraqi Government providing support and legitimacy for such initiatives could foster over the longer term political reconciliation between the participating Sunni Arabs and the national government. We also assess that under some conditions “bottom-up initiatives” could pose risks to the Iraqi Government.
• Such initiatives, if not fully exploited by the Iraqi Government, could over time also shift greater power to the regions, undermine efforts to impose central authority, and reinvigorate armed opposition to the Baghdad government.
• The polarization of communities is most evident in Baghdad, where the Shia are a clear majority in more than half of all neighborhoods and Sunni areas have become surrounded by predominately Shia districts. Where population displacements have led to significant sectarian separation, conflict levels have diminished to some extent because warring communities find it more difficult to penetrate communal enclaves.
• Kurdish leaders remain focused on protecting the autonomy of the Kurdish region and reluctant to compromise on key issues.

Or, to translate, the area where the surge has been most successful is in its "bottom-up" work in Sunni provinces, which has made the Sunnis more capable of resisting the Al Qaeda in Iraq groups. But by making Sunnis more self-sufficient, the surge has also made it increasingly unlikely that the Iraqi government will assert control over these regions. This is most clear in Kurdish areas, where Kurdish leaders have been actively working to establish an autonomous Kurdish state. Yet even in Baghdad--the area that, because of its previous diversity, really weighed against the possibility of a three-state split in Iraq--the sects are becoming homogeneous enough that violence has diminished.

In other words--the country is getting closer and closer to a de facto split, even if that's not the intent of US policies.

Which means I'd make a different conclusion about the NIE's description of how Iraq's troubles will affect the region.

Population displacement resulting from sectarian violence continues, imposing burdens on provincial governments and some neighboring states and increasing the danger of destabilizing influences spreading across Iraq’s borders over the next six to 12 months.

[snip]

The IC assesses that Iraq’s neighbors will continue to focus on improving their leverage in Iraq in anticipation of a Coalition drawdown. Assistance to armed groups, especially from Iran, exacerbates the violence inside Iraq, and the reluctance of the Sunni states that are generally supportive of US regional goals to offer support to the Iraqi Government probably bolsters Iraqi Sunni Arabs’ rejection of the government’s legitimacy.

(The NIE also includes specific details about Iranian and Turkish involvement in the country.)

If, as this NIE suggests, Iraq is getting increasingly homogenized into sectarian regions, then that increases the chance that Iraq's neighbors will intervene to ensure the resulting split benefits their own country. So while decreasing violence in Baghdad may be the results of a lot of ugly sectarian violence, that doesn't mean that splitting into three regions would diminish the violence in the region--because it would significantly increase the stakes for Iraq's neighbors.

Finally, here's a little tidbit I've got questions about:

Coalition forces, working with Iraqi forces, tribal elements, and some Sunni insurgents, have reduced al-Qa’ida in Iraq’s (AQI) capabilities, restricted its freedom of movement, and denied it grassroots support in some areas. [my emphasis]

Does this say what I think it says? That coalition forces are working with "some Sunni insurgents"? How are we going to win a counter-insurgency if we're fighting with insurgents?