

Cathie's Notes

Legit qns h been raised agbout how this sentec got in SOTU It's subjevt of ongoing invest bny PFIAB and IG Only at the conclus wil we know the truth But its clear already that the sent shoud never have been in the spch.

All involved bear some responsib for this & we at CIA do too.

There was fragmentary intell -- beyond what already included in [-- that the CIA cProlif task force asked an individ wi ties to Niger to gh^o and inquire. He reported that he met with a form er official ^{who} was unaware that any contracts or sales ^{had been} made. That there was a meetg by Iraq interpreted as an effort to acq yellow cake and the report did not resolve the issue definitively whether they had sought it.

It ^{was not} ^{the issue} rec'd wide ^{spread} lower level distrib but not high lighted to senior officials bcs didn't resolve. Niger officials knew ^{the information} wd be passed to US so ^{it} made denial less plausible. That they did not hav high confidednce in the reporting. Snr intel official left it out of their testimony bce uncertain Briut put it in white paper. we thught inconclusive, and urged them to take it out. Brits conficent and there fore left in their [a]ere

Sr intel offcils told Congresss this areas was an area where we differed from Brit

The yellowcake was not included in central reasons why we thought reconstituted thir nue program. Bur included for completeness. Includes INR doubt. The NIK said vigorous efforts by Ir to get more natural uran, that we could not conclude that it succeeded. That ir was not evidence of uranium and INR disagreed with the conclusion of Ir reconstitution of nuclear program.

White paper did not incl uranium bcs it was not central to conlcus pn recvonstit and doubts about the reporting for those reasons not included. It was not in CP UN statement

The above makes it even more troubling ^{that} the statement got into SOTU.

SOTU rec;d by agencies shortly before final

SOTU was divided into parts. Not yet final... The agc raised some concerns about text and it was changed. Onbasis of those changes agc judged it was factually true. BNut itdid not have the level of certainty that it shd have to put in SOTU. The clearnace process did not work as well as it shd have.

I am responsible. I shd have done a better job to prot Pres. And I didn't

The honest truth is that the CIA posed no obj to inclusion of statemnt. No one told WH to take it out

In the end of day no one said get it out

GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT

541
05 Cr. 394 (ID)

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CIA's ~~press~~ NIE stated that all agreed Iraq trying to constitute Nuclear weapons.

- unequivocally stated Iraq was vigorously trying to acquire uranium.
- while we said we didn't know
- ~~details of a~~

CIA's

CIA's NIE did not express doubt re Niger intel

~~MBS~~ VP, CONDI, ~~HADLEY~~, ~~SCOTT~~

OPTIONS

- * MTP - VP
- LEAK to Sanger/Pincus/NEWSMAG - sit down + give to him
- PRESS conference - CONDI/RUMSFELD
- op-ed

MTP	
PWO	WR
- BEST	- too weak
- control message.	- too defensive
	- raises bar

BDB Woodward all intel sit in a room + debate

NIE - We do there when not sure - what is threat?

- It is an estimate - make judgments -
- little press + fragments.

SOTY serious mistake Bush needs to explain

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