A Tale of Two NIEs

by emptywheel

One good thing about the spectacular abuse of intelligence to get us into the Iraq war: the intelligence community is acquiring a habit of releasing key judgments from its NIEs (I understand we'll get an Iraq NIE in time for September's moving of the goal posts). And when I read the claim yesterday that half the content of last week's NIE on terrorism came from detainee interrogations ...

According to one senior intelligence official, nearly half of the source material used in the recent National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorism threat to the United States came from C.I.A. interrogations of detainees.

... I decided it would be useful to compare this most recent NIE with the NIE on terror produced in April 2006 and released in late September 2006. After all, the NIEs have been produced in fairly quick succession. But the NIEs were produced under different Directors of National Intelligence (Death Squads Negroponte for the last one, and Mike McConnell for this one) and under different majority parties. The previous NIE, unlike this most recent one, may have relied on intelligence gathered using torture. And the previous one was only declassified after it was leaked that the NIE contradicted public statements from the Administration; whereas this one was developed with the understanding an unclassified version would be released

Some Things Haven't Changed

Many of the key judgments remain the same (although they use different vocabulary, which I'll get to in a moment). The judgments common to both include:

• US counterterrorism efforts have diminished the effectiveness of Al Qaeda, but it remains the biggest terrorist threat to the "Homeland"
• Globalization will produce non-Muslim "terrorist" groups that will conduct attacks

The 2006 NIE described these specifically as "leftist, nationalist, or separatist," whereas the 2007 NIE refers to them as "single-issue" groups and admits that the violence from such groups will be "small scale"

• The Internet will be used for terrorism

The 2006 NIE describes this in very general terms, explaining that "groups of all stripes" will use the Internet to "communicate, propagandize, recruit, train, and obtain logistical and financial support." The 2007 NIE focuses specifically on anti-US websites, particularly Salafi sites.

• Hezbollah will be inclined to attack if the US strikes Iran

Actually, this finding wasn't in the unclassified version of the 2006 NIE, though it was reported to be in the key findings. So that's one improvement--they're now declassifying the information that helps us argue against a war with Iran.

• Islamic extremists will continue to try to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials

Renewing the Vocabulary

What's most remarkable about reading the two NIEs side-by-side is the radical change in vocabulary. While talking about the same thing--the Al Qaeda affiliates in Iraq and more global Islamic extremism, the two NIEs use completely different language.

The 2006 NIE speaks of a,

global jihadist movement--which includes al Qa'ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells ... the global jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks a coherent global strategy, and is becoming more diffuse. New jihadist networks and cells, with anti-American agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge."

The language is vague, but it really seems to capture the haphazard nature of Islamic extremism, even that specifically affiliated with Al Qaeda. The language provides an easy way to explain one finding that doesn't show up in the 2007 NIE--even though recent terrorist attempts show it to remain true.

The jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for attacking Western interests. Extremist networks within the extensive Muslim diasporas in Europe facilitate recruitment and staging for urban attacks, as illustrated by the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings.

We've had two more significant attack attempts in the UK in the last year, but the 2007 NIE doesn't mention Europe at all in the unclassified Key Judgments.

There is a likely explanation for this: the 2007 NIE purports to address only "Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland" whereas the 2006 NIE addressed "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States." But that, in and of itself, is an important distinction. If we're worried about terrorists flying to the US from, say, the UK, then shouldn't we worry about the proliferation of extremist groups in Europe?

When the 2006 NIE refers to Islamic extremists in Iraq (both NIEs, it should be said, ignore Shiite extremism in Iraq), it does so in specific terms.

Al-Qa’ida, now merged with Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s network, is exploiting the situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to maintain its leadership role.

• The loss of key leaders, particularly Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would cause the group to fracture into smaller groups. Although like-minded individuals would endeavor to carry on the mission, the loss of these key leaders would exacerbate strains and disagreements. We assess that the resulting splinter groups would, at least for a time, pose a less serious threat to US interests than does al-Qa’ida.

• Should al-Zarqawi continue to evade capture and scale back attacks against Muslims, we assess he could broaden his popular appeal and present a global threat.

• The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of al-Qa’ida in Iraq might lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus their efforts on external operations.[my emphasis]
  

While this NIE makes similar claims to the 2007 NIE--claiming Al Qaeda and Zarqawi's group are "merged," at least the 2006 NIE speaks in specifics. And note the timing--this NIE was produced in April, Zarqawi was killed in June, and the NIE was declassified in September. The inclusion of these judgments may be an attempt to claim progress in Iraq where there was none.

But when you kill the figurehead of a terrorist movement, then you kind of have to depersonalize the presentation of that movement. So the 2007 NIE eschews the term "global jihadist" entirely. It makes no mention of other Sunni extremist groups, like Jemaah Islamiya, Ansar al-Sunnah, and North African groups, all mentioned in the 2006 NIE (again, this may be because of the difference in scope between the two NIEs; 2007 focused on the US while 2006 focused on global terrorism). With the exception of the reference to Salafi groups and the (welcome) reference to Hezbollah, it refers exclusively to Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). And it portrays AQI as a central part of Al Qaeda's efforts to attack the US.

We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to enhance its capabilities to attack the Homeland through greater cooperation with regional terrorist groups. Of note, we assess that al-Qa’ida will probably seek to leverage the contacts and capabilities of al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), its most visible and capable affiliate and the only one known to have expressed a desire to attack the Homeland. In addition, we assess that its association with AQI helps al-Qa’ida to energize the broader Sunni extremist community, raise resources, and to recruit and indoctrinate operatives, including for Homeland attacks. [my emphasis]

So that's one of the big--but subtle differences. The 2006 NIE said only that the Islamic extremism in Iraq might be exported. But the 2007 NIE claims that that terrorism is going to be exported in one direction, to the US "Homeland."

The 2007 NIE makes this claim even while it admits the big threat out there--Al Qaeda's reconstituted safe haven in Pakistan.

Wither Democratization?

Perhaps the most striking difference in the two NIEs, though, is the different approach to the causes of terrorism. The 2006 NIE includes an entire page discussing the causes and vulnerabilities of terrorism, including this paragraph worthy of Chomsky.

Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist movement: (1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the Iraq “jihad;” (3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US sentiment among most Muslims—all of which jihadists exploit.

From this set of grievances, the NIE discusses how addressing those grievances--most notably by bringing increased democratization to Muslim countries--will diminish the attraction of terrorism. The 2006 NIE says this twice, first in describing one of the biggest weaknesses of Al Qaeda

Greater pluralism and more responsive political systems in Muslim majority nations would alleviate some of the grievances jihadists exploit. Over time, such progress, together with sustained, multifaceted programs targeting the vulnerabilities of the jihadist movement and continued pressure on al-Qa’ida, could erode support for the jihadists.

And again after rehearsing all the other vulnerabilities of Islamic extremism.

If democratic reform efforts in Muslim majority nations progress over the next five years, political participation probably would drive a wedge between intransigent extremists and groups willing to use the political process to achieve their local objectives. Nonetheless, attendant reforms and potentially destabilizing transitions will create new opportunities for jihadists to exploit.

But the recent NIE makes no mention of the grand plan to moderate the Islamic world by spreading democracy at the point of a gun. To a degree, this is welcome--Bush's blind faith that you could spread democracy with tanks was bound to crash against reality. And it's pretty clear that we're not going to bring functional democracy to Iraq--certainly not in the middle of a civil war.

Yet it is disturbing that our latest NIE puts aside all discussion of the causes of terrorism or potential soft power means to prevent it from acquiring support among the moderate Muslim populace.

Comments

[zhiv]

Solid start to a Sunday, ew. Where would we be without you? Following the obvious general question (these are our allies?) and your lead from over a month ago (is anybody besides Cheney dealing with this?), and then seeing others (natural gas pipeline deal no one knows about), now it seems everything is ever so slowly focusing on Pakistan. I was looking for it from the Democrats in the Senate withdrawl debate, where there was a lot of "we didn't finish the job in Afghanistan, and Bush began his war of choice in Iraq," but no one seemed to get as far as "look at what's happening in Pakistan!" Any update on the Cheney Pakistan portfolio?

And my own Sunday morning (earlier on west coast) thought/question is that it seems the intriguing current congress' oversight/criminal investigations, while it will continue to be "fun" and compelling, is going to pretty much run out the clock on this administration (well played, Fred Fielding--should have guessed that Cheney had a player like FF buried deep on his bench for 4th quarter crunchtime), especially when you consider that a lot of the content will be turned into 08 campaign material. But what happens with investigating and charging all of the outgoing crooks in 09? This assumes that the Dems don't mess it up and there's no Rovian math we don't know about. With a real Justice department, and an Admin that is actually looking for the truth (partly out of partisan glee and retribution, yes) rather than trying to kill the constitution to protect itself, what can and what will they do?

Not giving up the current fight, but some frustations lead to wondering about the next phase. And if we're wondering about it, you know that Bush-Cheney-Rove and Fielding have their own timetable and have a good idea of how they want things to go.

[Boo Radley]

OfT, IIRC, last week (imvho in response to the increasing likelihood that we are pulling out) Shia legislators (loyal to Moqtada al-Sadr) ended their boycott.

[masaccio]

EW, in today's newspaper, in the Week in Review section of the NYT, there is a comparison of the 2000 NIE with the 2007, and the similarities are just amazing. I cannot find it on-line, and I am a Times Select member.

[bmaz]

masaccio - Is this what you were referring to? http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/22/weekinreview/22mazzetti.html?ref=weekinreview I am pretty sure it is.

[masaccio]

bmaz, yes, it is the graphic on the left under the picture of George Tenet and Frances Townsend. Nice find.

[masaccio]

bmaz, it is indeed, the graphic you click on under the pictures of George Tenet and Frances Townsend. Nice find!

[masaccio]

Once would have been enough.

[Larry Johnson]

Questions Congress Needs to Ask About the Latest NIE

http://noquarterusa.net/blog/2007/07/23/questions-congress-needs-to-ask-about-the-latest-nie/

There is a significant and unexplained disconnect between the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Defending the Homeland and the April 2006 NIE, Trends in Global Terrorism.

How do we get from “seriously damaged” to “regenerated”?

A careful reading of the NIE on The Terrorist Threat to the Homeland fails to reveal any empirical or intelligence data to justify the conclusions.

What is up DNI Director Mike McConnell? Is the DNI and the NIC confusing their fears with reality? It sure looks like it. It is time for the Senate and House intelligence committees to get some firm, clear answers.

[William Ockham]

ew,

I'm curious about this sentence in your post:

The previous NIE, unlike this most recent one, may have relied on intelligence gathered using torture.

I don't understand the basis for this statement. Why should we think that the current NIE isn't based on intelligence gathered using torture?