Woodward's State of Denial and Plame

by emptywheel

I mentioned to a few people off-line that there is one passage in State of Denial that addresses an ongoing question relating to the Plame Affair. Actually, two questions. Throw in a passage from One Percent Doctrine, and the recent versions of Tenet's story really cloud an already fuzzy picture of his activities during leak week.

In his treatment of leak week, Woodward starts--without explanatory comment--on July 5, not July 6 (as you'd expect, if it were a response to Wilson's op-ed).

On Saturday, July 5, Tenet talked to the chief NSC spokesperson, Anna Perez. As best she could tell, the fact that the 16 words about the uranium had made it into the State of the Union address was the result of failures in both the NSC staff and the CIA. "We're both going to have to eat some of this," Perez said. Something should be done to correct the record on what the president had said in his speech. 

[snip]

Tenet agreed with Perez that all would share the blame. The plan was to work on a joint statement over the weekend that would be put out on Monday. Rice and Tenet spoke next and agreed that they had to put the issue to bed. Rice was with the president traveling in Africa. Hadley and some NSC staffers worked on a draft but they couldn't reach an agreement. (231-2)

Woodward is obviously playing with the timing, here. The July 5 date is plausible--but it's unclear whether this is a response to Wilson's op-ed as it appeared on the NYT webpage (Wilson describes the op-ed being posted at 10:30 on Saturday night), whether the White House had advance warning (as some of us have speculated--this would have important bearing on Libby's July 2 meeting with an unnamed journalist, as well as OVP's seeding of the Frances Fragos Townsend smear with Novak), or whether the White House was just coming to its own senses regarding its misrepresentations of the Niger intelligence (ha!). And of course, Woodward seamlessly moves into events that occurred on July 7 or after, describing Condi already in Africa in a passage that is supposed to take place on July 5 (and in any case before Monday, when the statement was supposed to appear). The weird timing continues in the passage.

Tenet said he would put out a statement. On Tuesday, July 8, however, after Ambassador Joseph Wilson's New York Times op-ed piece cast doubt on the claim, the White House released a statement saying, "Knowing all we know now, the reference to Iraq's attempt to acquire uranium from Africa should not have been included in the State of the Union speech." (232)

Suddenly, Wilson's op-ed appears to come out two days after it really did, on Tuesday rather than Sunday. Moreover, Ari's statement, released just as the plane left on July 7, appears to come out on Tuesday July 8 as well. Perhaps Woodward is trying to pretend these discussions were not a response to Wilson's op-ed. But he--or Condi--would need a time machine to pull this off.

Regurgitation Old Fights

One reason this is significant is because of a fight that broke out last summer over who drafted the Tenet statement and when they drafted it. Libby and Rove claimed credit for drafting the statement, starting early in the week.

Back at the White House, Mr. Rove and Mr. Libby had been at work all week, along with Ms. Rice's deputy, Stephen Hadley, helping to craft a statement that was issued on Friday by George Tenet, the C.I.A. director. Mr. Tenet did precisely what the White House needed: he took responsibility for the inclusion of the 16 words on uranium in the president's speech, and he made clear that Mr. Cheney had neither dispatched Mr. Wilson to Niger nor been briefed on what he found there.

But shortly thereafter, the CIA refuted that claim, arguing that the CIA drafted the statement, with one review from Hadley, later in the week.

On July 9, Tenet and top aides began to draft a statement over two days that ultimately said it was "a mistake" for the CIA to have permitted the 16 words about uranium to remain in Bush's speech. He said the information "did not rise to the level of certainty which should be required for presidential speeches, and the CIA should have ensured that it was removed."

A former senior CIA official said yesterday that Tenet's statement was drafted within the agency and was shown only to Hadley on July 10 to get White House input. Only a few minor changes were accepted before it was released on July 11, this former official said. He took issue with a New York Times report last week that said Rove and Vice President Cheney's chief of staff, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, had a role in Tenet's statement.

And neither of these versions accord with the versions in State of Denial and One Percent Doctrine.

Suskind's Version

Let's start with Suskind's story. Suskind starts on July 11, avoiding any question of what happened earlier in the week. Though he does provide a short summary of the lead-up to Wilson's op-ed.

Since March, when the International Atomic Energy Agency filed a report showing that the documents underlying the yellowcake claims--by both the British and Americans--were forgeries, the administration had been working hard to dodge the issue, moving from denial to acceptance and stagey surprise. Their goal was to avoid admitting that it might have known the Niger assertion was hollow long before Bush relied on it in making the case for war in his January State of the Union address. That was all but impossible after Wilson's column. Now the issue was finding someone to blame. [snip] Elaboration about Wilson and Niger would be Condi's job. (243-4)

So she calls Tenet in Sun Valley, ID in the middle of the night. Tenet's at some retreat and is scheduled to make an address to the retreat the following day, July 11. Over the phone, Tenet reviewed with Condi all the warnings the CIA gave the White House.

They talked briefly about flurries of faxes between NSC and CIA on the day before the State of the Union in January, and that it was difficult for CIA to get a handle on all that NSC was proffering, fax by fax, on deadline. In other words, there was, in this case, a trail of paper, a few clear recollections, and visible actions.

Tenet's rendition of the key, probably discoverable, evidence in the matter might incline someone like Rice--who, along with the President, bears some culpability in this matter--to acknowledge what she knew and when she knew it. (244)

But, as Suskind describes, Condi went out and made a statement that dumped everything on Tenet anyway. It's worth pointing out, though, that on the day that Tenet walked her through all the pre-SOTU exchanges, Condi also accidentally revealed that the SOTU included the words "Niger" and "500 tons." The timing, as revealed by Suskind, increases the already high chances that Condi was actually telling the truth with that comment.

In any case, Suskind goes on to describe how pissed Tenet was.

While the conventional response is to surmise Rice said what she said in spite of Tenet's predawn briefing, it is probably more apt to say she singly blamed CIA because of what Tenet told her. He had a strong case of shared culpability to make; her job was to preempt the emergence of that case with overwhelming force.

Meanwhile, through the morning hours, Tenet was on the phone with his team back at Langley, as they constructed their own statement to release--a statement that they ran by Karl Rove and other aides at the White House. (245-6)

Suskind describes Tenet's deputies as digging up the dirt on the Cincinnati speech that would implicate Hadley.

But Tenet assuming blame--while Rice fiercely leveled accusations--was more than Tenet's protective minions at CIA could bear. They took matters into their own hands. Over the next week, CIA leakers noted the particulars of the Cincinnati incident. The White House was forced to sacrifice Hadley as bearing some blame--he had, after all, received written objections to an almost identical set of words in the speech he and Tenet fenced over. (246)

Woodward's Version

Huh. So far this doesn't fit either version described in last summer's fight over timing. And neither does Woodward's State of Denial, which describes Rice laying it all at Tenet's doorstep, then describes Tenet's response.

"Condi shoved it right up my ass," Tenet told a colleague. They had an agreement and had been working on a joint statement for two days. Now Rice had dropped a dime on him, blaming only the CIA. The problem was a classic. Two views of the Niger-uranium issue had existed inside his CIA. At the lower level, they believed a connection was possible. But Tenet had access to the highest-level, most sensitive intelligence from a foreign intelligence service that had an agent inside Saddam's government who discounted the Niger-uranium story.

Okay, maybe I'm stupid, but so far Woodward has described a joint statement as starting on July 5, getting scuttled on July 8 with Ari's statement (which actually took place on July 7), and then apparently starting on July 9 (which is when the CIA said the drafting process started last summer).

And then Woodward reveals this little tidbit: Tenet had information from someone inside Saddam's government that discounted the Niger story. It sounds like that's a description of Naji Sabri, Saddam's foreign minister that Bill Murray, the CIA's Paris station chief, was trying to recruit or get to defect. If so, that would add another major piece of intelligence from the French excluded from the SSCI. We know the SSCI doesn't list any of the warnings against the Niger forgeries the French apparently gave us during summer 2002. It doesn't list Sabri's warnings that there were no WMDs, either. But Woodward suggests Sabri said something specific relating to the Niger forgeries. Which begs the question--did Sabri not say anything about the mobile bioweapons labs? Because Tenet was pushing that story actively during the SOTU/UN Speech period. I'm guessing--but it's just a guess--that Sabri said something specific about the Niger claims that made Tenet back off.

And, finally, Woodward's version includes no review of Tenet's statement by Rove, one item that was contested in last summer's competing versions.

Tenet decided to fall on his sword. The statement was retooled so he would take full responsibility. He released it that night to avoid a second-day story.

[snip]

It was 100 percent public grovel, and Tenet was privately furious. He had the CIA search all its records to see what had been passed in writing to the White House. The CIA found two memos sent to the White House just before the October 2002 Cincinnati speech voicing doubts about the intelligence that Iraq was trying to buy uranium in Africa.

Instead of taking the memos to Rice or Hadley, Tenet took them to Andy Card, effectively dropping his own dime on the president's national security adviser and her deputy. Card heard Tenet out.

"I was not told the truth," Card said ominously. He directed that the White House investigate.

Full war was now on between the CIA and the White House.

Eleven days after Tenet's public mea culpa, Hadley went before the press to take his turn. (232-3)

I've got timing questions again. Did Tenet give the two memos to Card during leak week (which has obvious implications for the Plame leak, and might impact the Pincus-source search, since it might mean Card knew of the warnings in time to talk to Pincus for his July 13 article). And then, just for kicks, Woodward throws this little Armitage snippet in there, right in the middle of the CIA-WH spat.

Armitage was pretty sure that Hadley had taken a figurative bullet not for the president so much as for the vice president. It was Cheney who was the strongest advocate that Saddam had been reconstituting his nuclear program.

In private, Tenet told Armitage he believed that Hadley was a Cheney-Rumsfeld "sleeper agent"--an intelligence term for an undercover agent who lurks dormant without a mission for years, but who can be awakened to do the bidding of his handlers. It was a hyperbolic statement, but it reflected the growing animus between the CIA and the NSC. (234)

You know how everyone says Woodward has given up his protective craven ways with his State of Denial? Not entirely, I think. His version of this story differs with the known stories in some key ways. Perhaps now he's protecting his buddy Armitage and Tenet. But if he's protecting Tenet, why does his story differ from Suskind's, which is in many ways Tenet's story? And finally, why do both differ from the CIA version circulated last summer, which said that Tenet and Harlow developed Tenet's statement in isolation from the White House, starting on July 9?

Not like I've got any easy answers to these questions, mind you. But I thought the questions worth asking.

Update: Some minor changes.

Comments

[William Ockham]

The more obvious conclusion is that Woodward is protecting Woodward. I have not read "State of Denial", but my impression is that the book is his attempt to recover his reputation as a reporter. The only way to make sense out of his current narrative is to read it as a revision of the narrative of his previous two Bush books. Of course, he's expecting readers who share the Washington press corps attitude of "today's narrative is the way it's always been" (e.g., Bush can get away with saying "stay the course" has never been our strategy).

[emptywheel]

Perhaps--but it does more than that. How does completely muddling a fairly well-known (and if not well-known, then easily accessible) timeline help Woodward's reputation as a journalist.

[mainsailset]

Perhaps Woodward games on the lack of engagement of most every journalist who has somewhat covered this story to indeed timeline it themselves. Rather than put this version out there to preserve his historical image, he's still counting on it to revise history to become the new timeline. There's been so little treatment of this Woodward passage in the book by reviewers, it reads more like filler that he was tossing in than substantive media candy he was hoping would sell the book. He treats it like yesterday's garbage, to me another indication that he never really got the importance of this chapter.

[SaltinWound]

It seems to me like Card is Woodward's big source. Is there any way fudging the timing could benefit Card?

[Jodi]

Have any of your people ever gone back and corrected/altered/changed/deleted/added to your planner, your calender, your timeline.

I do it quite a bit as I realize things a few days later, and add tibits, etc.

These things are not sacred.

HOWEVER WHEN THE PROSECUTOR GETS A COPY, YOU ARE THEN FIXED FOREVER IN TIME EVEN IF WHAT HE HAS IS INCORRECT.

But if you have time and presence of mind...

[Jeff]

1. I was puzzled by Woodward's description of what happened the weekend of July 5-6, and I do wonder whether he just got some of the timing wrong, especially given the weird reference to Rice being in Africa. Given that Tenet's July 11 statement was clearly put out sooner than anyone anticipated - consider, for instance, the fact that Novak's July 14 column clearly does not report on it, and probably was finished earlier in the day on July 11 - I wonder whether Woodward got his weekends mixed up. Thus, the plan during the week of July 7-12 would have been for them to finalize a Tenet statement over the weekend of the 12-13th for release on July 14. (As a sidenote, Novak may have intended his column to complement, so to speak, such a statement.)

2. That said, Libby in his filings is clearly pushing the idea that there were extensive discussions between the White House, CIA and OVP that culminated in Tenet's statement, which may of course be efforts to make it sound like all the discussions were geared in a direction they were not in fact. But Fitzgerald has acknowledged that there were drafts floating around OVP of Tenet's statement. So whatever else is the case, that NYT report of what the CIA was saying is wrong. Libby did have input on Tenet's statement. My suspicion is that there is a lot of parsing going on, with regard to what counted as a draft of the statement and that sort of thing. For instance, maybe Tenet's people began drafting a statement on July 9; but maybe they'd already been given a statement by the White House, and they just worked up their own, taking that one into some account.

3. I was floored by Woodward's disclosure that Tenet had intelligence from Sabri or someone in the Iraqi government that there was nothing to the Niger story, and I tried to ask Woodward about it during last week's online discussion at the WaPo. But instead he took hard-hitting questions like, Have you been back to the garage in person? I kid you not.

4. I would guess that the conversation between Tenet and Card, where Tenet told Card about the CIA-to-White House memos for the Cincinnati speech, happened pretty late in the game, like around the 19th, since I doubt Bartlett would have had the press conference he did on the 18th, only to turn around for the one of the 22nd with Hadley, if they'd heard from Card what the CIA had on them. And on the 22nd, the official White House story was that Gerson had found one of the memos in his files over the weekend. So that may be strictly speaking true, but it may have only been after prompting from Tenet via Card. polly and I hashed this out a little at the bottom of this thread.

[emptywheel]

Jeff

I wonder how the declassification of the NIE aligns with this. Obviously, OVP's intent was just to declassify the parts of the NIE that helped them. But because of the revelations before and during teh week of 7/7, they end up having to declassify the INR and DOE dissents, which is pretty damning. Was that something CIA forced (not that it helped CIA much). Or was it something that State forced?

Given these somewhat competing stories, I'd also like to return to one of the most curious comments in the original Novak article:

Even after a belated admission of error last Monday, finger-pointing between Bush administration agencies continued. Messages between Washington and the presidential entourage traveling in Africa hashed over the mission to Niger.

First, Novak only mentions DC and Africa, not Idaho (though that's not a big deal). But it's doubtful his source for this is Harlow--I've always assumed it was either Rove (likely, because it's so insider baseball, it's more likely Rove would share it) or Armi (which would say State was involved in the debates). But mostly, I've been curious why Novak included it.

[William Ockham]

After a second read through of this post, I've altered my view a bit. Woodward's account has deceptions far more serious than the timeline. First, the idea that low-level CIA people believed the Niger story while upper management was sceptical is laughable on its face. Woodward is heavily invested in the "Clash of the Titans" approach to history. All of his books focus on the interplay of larger than life "serious thinkers" competing to set national policy which is then implemented by lower-level "men of action".

The slow grind of actual policy-making, the blundering of incompetent leaders, and the principled stands of people like Joe Wilson just don't have any real place in his narratives. I think he screws up the timeline simply because it is not important to him. The actual order of events, the centrality of the Wilson op-ed, and the total falsity of the Niger claims aren't really meaningful to Woodward. He's more than willing to blur all that so he can get to what's really important, Rice giving Tenet the shiv and Tenet striking back.

[emptywheel]

WO

Interesting perspective. Though I think the lower level/higher level stuff is code for "WINPAC the shills" and "the rest of the credible intelligence community."

[William Ockham]

ew,

I don't think there are very many people who would read it that way, outside of the folks on this board. I think it is pretty funny the way Woodward implies that Sabri was the reason Tenet was sceptical. The NBC reports on Sabri had it the other way. The CIA was sceptical of Sabri because he didn't back the Agency's (or Adminstration's) view of Iraq's nuclear program.

[Jeff]

emptywheel

My sense is this: the formal declassification process would have to culminate in a decision by the head of the relevant agency, and I take that to have been Tenet, at the time, since the NIE is produced by the NIC, which at the time fell under his umbrella, if I'm not mistaken. State may have had input, but I think the decision would be made by Tenet (though again that could be incorrect). Hadley was involved, we know, and Libby talked with Hadley about it, apparently in the days following July 8. Novak's column also obviously shows awareness about the White House effort to have the CIA declassify the report based on Wilson's trip, which seems to have been part of the same effort.

I have always thought that Tenet, perhaps with prodding from State, perhaps not, would have wanted to get the dissents and that stuff out there, all of which made the administration look pretty bad. I think that same double edge is apparent in his July 11 statement. So as far as I can tell, State could not have forced a declassification through the regular process any more than OVP could.

I don't know about that line from Novak.

[peanutgallery]

Read about the Idaho retreat here http://mail.indymedia.org/mediapolitics/2003-July/000434.html. Why doesn't the presence of Tenet at a information company lovefest surprise me? Sounds like more Aspen and Jackson Hole. Reason enough not to mention it.

[peanutgallery]

Read about the Idaho retreat here http://mail.indymedia.org/mediapolitics/2003-July/000434.html. Why doesn't the presence of Tenet at a information company lovefest surprise me? Sounds like more Aspen and Jackson Hole. Reason enough not to mention it.

[Jeff]

One thing to add. It's worth noting how Libby's defense frames the discussions among OVP, White House and CIA in the week of July 6-12 in their 10-2-06 filing. They claim part of why they need the Niger/Wilsonn documents is because they'll show

there was extensive discussion among the OVO, the White House, and the CIA of a factual rebuttal to his charges, culminating in Director of Centrial Intelligence Tenet's statement on July 11.

That makes it sound like - though it avoids actually asserting that - the extensive discussion was all geared toward producing Tenet's statement. It was probably less obvious where things were going for all the participants earlier in the week. But as emptywheel has suggested, the idea that it was all geared to Tenet's statement serves as a convenient excuse for whatever discussion OVP and the White House more generally were involved in.

That said, I still think that the CIA denial of White House involvement is a weak denial.

[Jeff]

For all those keeping score at home, the government did in fact today file its specific objections to classified information Libby wants to introduce as evidence, as it had proposed to do, but not surprisingly the filing is sealed. This appears to have to do with Libby's testimony as proferred at the CIPA hearings already held at the end of September and beginning of October, and the highlighted documents that were attached by the defense in their letter to Fitzgerald on October 5, right after that round of hearings ended. Both had to do with Libby's Memory Defense. I'm not sure if this also has to do with the Wilson/Niger documents, on some of which the judge is also going to have to make a decision.

[Jodi]

emptywheel

A few observations that actually delayed bedtime.

The process here is interesting which is one reason I have hung around though my own opinion solidified sometime ago. But only one.

The sleuthing on this topic is amazing.
The constant sifting, and resifting.
The constant tracking, and retracking.
The constant press for more information from the Prosecutor, the Defense, the Judge, the participants.

The amount of energy!

I have a question though.

Usually when we find the answer of a perplexing problem, is it because of the tiny, tiny little bits of information, or is it something larger, more easily digestible?

Point, you are searching the sands of the beach for a "diamond."

But historically isn't the usable "find" something larger?

Or puttng it again, perhaps more in your terms, emptywheel, are you facing increasingly diminishing returns for your efforts? And does that indicate that nothing is left? At least until some new revelation occurs.

Of course that doesn't negate what you already have and whatever that means.

[jwp]

Emptywheel,

Your efforts remain valuable. Carry on.

[katie Jensen]

Jodi,

You may have a point. Whether or not what Cheney, Libby and Rove did was illegal may be questionable. That's what we are all looking to prove. However, you are correct that with the facts already available it is clear that this administration has very little respect for the american people and it's institutions. Bush/Cheney have shown very little regard for human life and the example of Valerie Plame is just a small example of the larger more pervasive problem with this administration.

[Jodi]

Katie,

I totally agree that Bush/Cheney should be pilloried for the aftermath of the Iraq War.

And further I think (and did so before the war) that more thought should have been given into why we were going into Iraq. What was the hurry? Yes I know what the immediate hurry was because of the time of the year they were going in, the season, for my brother and my father were being suited up. My father delayed retirement because he wanted to help and now he worries over the wounded that will be with us a long, long time. I had another brother in Afghanistan at the same time.
But there is always next year. No one, no one had an idea that the Iraqis were going to produce an Atomic bomb in a year. What was the hurry? Only political leanings. And so Bush/Cheney came up with a laundry list of reasons to go. Some of those reasons are worthy, but not for 3,000 US deaths and counting. Counting, counting, .... Not for 2 Trillion (USD). Not for , ... Not, not, ...

The thing that is most henious in my mind is that the Army Chief of Staff was pilloried for saying that more than 300,000 men would be needed on the ground. [[But that wasn't convenient to the idea of a war and a tax cut.]] That is pure politics that have resulted in the loss of thousands of American lives.
These politicians didn't operate in a vacuum. Even now they have stacked the deck with Military Leadership that they have selected that is pliable. Sometimes though even their lap dogs turn on them. And you should see it more and more.

Bush and Cheney didn't see this Iraqi War as a sacrifice that must be borne by all. Rather they saw it as a POLITICAL GAIN for themselves and their cronies!!

For all the above, Bush/Cheney deserve to be hung upside down on a wall in the Mall. And let little children throw rocks at them, and dogs bark at them.

Plame? I know the feelings here about that issue. I won't say any more about it now.

[JohnLopresti]

I need to study the timelines, an interesting topic, when I have a moment.
I appreciate pg's resourceful link to the media pow-wow Tenet attended; there is a similar yearly fling in a private resort about sixty miles from our place, though instead of media orientation the mix primarily is politicoes of Republican affiliation, and often includes a few notables from overseas; the gathering usually is picketed by a few stalwarts, from afar.
On the bookwriting, the latest estimate for the Tenet version is February 1, 2007.
It is poetic justice, that the college professor in nowSecy Rice blurted out the firebrand specifics about the speechwriting preCincinnati.
Somewhat more O.T.: a followup article on Carl Schmitt with expanded context. I remember ew wrote earnestly a long time ago about some (misguided) folks in the neo-postModern coterie. The author Horton has several passages discussing how to report history accurately.

[JohnLopresti]

In the media world in 2003 FCC was still waiting patiently to undo the Clinton era rule on UNEs, the so-called unbundling of network elements; finally the court processes in early 2004 cleared the way for a Bush era rewriting of the rule, and by 2005 the Powell chairmanship at FCC closed. This shift in policy relates to the network neutrality discussion.
Still following pg's thoughtful link to the description of the goings-on at the media leader gathering attended by Tenet, also around the 2003 timeframe a private company produced television footage without attribution on government funds, an issue which settled for a nominal penalty this past week. I recall ew writing about a public relations firm which outsourced information services, I believe the writing ew did was in one of the background articles on Judy.
I suppose the media relationship to the intell service is fairly mundane, a necessary part of the job for Tenet, as well as for other outward facing officials of various agencies. We know this administration waxed innovative with ways to utilize media, and somewhere peripherally perhaps, this figures in the Plame story and its consequences. Only these ruminations, distant perhaps from the alibi construction which is very central to the divergent timeline fables which are the center of the post ew elaborated, above; yet, media was important as an administration initiative and 2003 clearly was a time when the strategy was nearly fully deployed; only FCC lagged, based on the court's deliberate pace.

[Sara]

EW

What intrigued me about Woodward's book was his apparently very well sourced reconstruction of the process by which David Kay was brought onboard by Tenet beginning June 5, 2003, to take over the WMD search. (Look at Chapter 21). By the time the Niger matter emerged in July, Kay had been read into all of the WMD intelligence, and spent a good deal of time with Tenet pointing out huge holes in the intelligence as well as the analysis on which he had depended. I think it might be useful to line up the described Tenet-Kay conversations with the Libby-Cheney-Wilson-and full cast of characters, largely because it is possible Tenet's subsequent actions were more influenced by what Kay was reporting to him openly and privately from Iraq. At the same time Tenet was being pressured to fall on his sword for the story line about pre-war WMD analysis and intelligence, he was also learning from Kay precisely how flawed all that was -- and the Kay Mission was in many ways an orphan -- Rumsfeld had declined to assist in sponsoring it, and eventually Cheney and his group would act to perhaps derail it. In the end it was Kay's efforts that mostly knocked the pins out from under the WMD matter.

[obsessed]

You guys'll get a grin or two out of this description of Fitzgerald cross-examination of Libby's memory expert hack.

http://msnbc.msn.com/id/15432154/