by emptywheel
Twice before,
I have tried to tell the Plame Story as a narrative. Lots has been
revealed since I last told the story, just before Libby got indicted,
so I thought I'd update it here. I'll warn you--it has grown from big to gigantic, so I'll do it in three parts or more.
The Background--Niger Claims and Power Struggles: 2002-2003
I'll start with some background. There are two reasons why members
of the Bush Administration were reckless enough to out a covert spy. First, Joe Wilson's criticisms risked exposing the
Administration's efforts to sustain claims about the Niger
intelligence they knew to be false. Circumstantial evidence suggests that Neocons Michael Ledeen and Harold Rhode may have played a role in planting the Niger forgeries and John Bolton played a role in stovepiping the forgeries within the US Intelligence Community (IC). And whether or not BushCo had a
active, deliberate role in producing the forgeries, they certainly
sustained the claim that Niger tried to sell Iraq yellowcake even after
that claim had been debunked. eRiposte details the many warnings against the Niger intelligence here, and he proves that the SOTU claim depended on the Niger intelligence here.
In other words, the "16 words" in the State of the Union Address (SOTU)--claiming that Iraq had sought uranium from Africa--were based on the
Niger claim, and the Administration had known that claim to be bogus by
October 2002.
I'll add just two critical points: the INR Iraq nuclear analyst--whose October 15 debunking of the Niger forgeries appears to have been suppressed--definitely warned WINPAC
(the same part of the CIA that eventually approved the SOTU claims)
that the documents were forgeries by January 12 or 13, 2003, two weeks
before the SOTU. Also in January, the National Intelligence Council
(the intelligence organization charged with issuing definitive
statements about the IC's judgments) issued a memo just completely dismissing the intelligence.
The Niger story was baseless and should be laid to rest. ... the memo ...arrived at the White House as Bush
and his highest-ranking advisers made the uranium story a centerpiece
of their case for the rapidly approaching war against Iraq.
In
other words, the Bush Administration was warned they should not use the
Niger claim just before they used it in the SOTU. So when, in a March
CNN appearance, Joe Wilson stated "the U.S. government knew more about
the Niger uranium matter than it was
letting on," the comment had to have made BushCo worry that their
deliberate disregard for warnings from the IC would be exposed,
regardless of whether it was Wilson's report--or other intelligence
reports--that debunked the Niger claims.
And not only had the Bush Administration been warned before they used this intelligence. They were reminded they had been warned. Sometime in spring-summer 2003, Stephen Hadley did a review of the intelligence claims Bush used to justify war; he concluded the aluminum tube claim was based on discredited intelligence. And the INR memo--which
Grossman briefed the White House on in June 2003--documented the INR
analyst's January warning that the Niger documents were forgeries.
BushCo had pleaded ignorance that the Niger documents were forgeries in
March 2003, presumably so they could still launch their war. But as
early as June 2003, more evidence surfaced that their plea of ignorance was
a lie.