From Rove to Hadley to the Rest of the Conspiracy

by emptywheel

I described yesterday that Rove's further testimony may provide Fitzgerald with a whole lot more evidence on the provenance of the Plame leak. Since Fitzgerald now knows whether the "I learned it from a journalist" ruse has any basis in truth or not, he has the leverage to push Rove to explain precisely how information on Plame's identity got from a person who had the need to know her identity to those--like Bob Novak--who didn't have a need to know.

Murray Waas provides more detail about the likely scope of Rove's testimony, specifying (among other things) that Rove will testify about his communications with Stephen Hadley.

He will also be questioned regarding contacts with other senior administration officials, such as then-deputy National Security advisor Stephen J. Hadley and I. Lewis Libby, the chief of staff to Vice President Dick Cheney in the critical week before the publication of columnist Robert Novak's column on July 14, 2003, which outed Plame as a covert CIA operative.

I have no doubt Fitzgerald will be asking precisely those questions--and I'm quite gleeful about the prospect of Rove testifying about Hadley without the shield of some of his previous excuses. Pinning down Hadley's role in the conspiracy will be key to exposing the full breadth and height of the conspiracy.

Why Hadley is key

This White House--actually all recent White Houses--have long used National Security Council staff as a tool to shield executive activities from Congressional or legal scrutiny. Because the National Security Advisor position evolved as a special advisor to the President, it fell under executive privilege guidelines that accrued to the President himself. As the NSA became an increasingly important position (think Henry Kissinger), this privilege came to extend to the staffers who reported to the NSA. At first, the activities of the NSC staff were restricted to providing advice. But over time, NSC staffers began to conduct operations, most famously, the series of plots now called Iran-Contra. (For a more detailed description of this process, check out the first chapter of Theodore Draper's A Very Thin Line.)

This administration has been no different. They attempted to use this precedent to avoid having Condi Rice testify under oath to the 9/11 Commission. And they apparently used it to withhold documents from the SSCI inquiry into Iraq intelligence. For example, in two examples relating to the vetting of presidential statements about Iraqi attempts to reconstitute their nuclear program in September 2002, the SSCI got only NSC explanations (one apparently written, one apparently verbal) of what happened in the vetting process rather than drafts themselves.

In a written response to questions from Committee staff, the White House said that on September 11, 2002, National Security Council (NSC) staff contacted the CIA to clear language for possible use in a statement [relating to the aluminum tubes] for use by the President.

In a response to questions from Committee staff, the White House said that on September 24, 2002, NSC staff contacted the CIA to clear another statement [about Iraq's attempts to acquire yellowcake] for use by the President. (SSCI 49, 51 emphasis mine)

Similarly, when a dispute arose between WINPAC head Alan Foley and the White House over whether early drafts of the SOTU included references to Niger, the White House didn't send documents over. They just sent Robert Joseph over to tell the SSCI (read, lie about) what the documents said.

The WINPAC Director and the NSC Special Assistant disagreed, however, about the content of their conversation in some important respects. First, when the WINPAC Director first spoke to Committee staff and testified at a Committee hearing, he said that he had told the NSC Special Assistant to remove the words "Niger" and "500 tons" from the speech because of concerns about sources and methods. The NSC Special Assistant told Committee staff that there never was a discussion about removing "Niger" and "500 tons" from the State of the Union and said that the drafts of the speech show that neither "Niger" nor "500 tons" were ever in any of the drafts at all.

A few days after his testimony before the Committee, the WINPAC Director found the draft text of the State of the Union in WINPAC's files and noticed that it did not say "500 tons of uranium from Niger." In a follow up interview with Committee staff, he said that he still recalls the conversation the way he described it to the Committee originally, however, he believes that he may have confused the two conversations because the documentation he found does not support his version of events. The draft text of the State of the Union he found said, "we know that he [Saddam Hussein] has recently sought to buy uranium in Africa." The White House also told the Committee that the text they sent to the CIA in January said, "we also know that he has recently sought to buy uranium in Africa." ( SSCI 65, emphasis mine)

The actual drafts of the famous Cincinnati speech appear to have been turned over to the SSCI. But that seems to be the exception, not the rule. Usually, if it related to a question involving the NSC, the White House told the SSCI what went on, rather than demonstrating it with documentary evidence.

Which is not to say the White House is hiding behind the NSC in this case. But we know  that Fitzgerald has respected the notion of executive privilege, at least to some extent. When he interviewed Bush and Cheney on the Plame Affair, they were not under oath.

Evidence they're hiding something with Hadley

In fact, it appears that Rove has already tried to cover up for his communication with Hadley. Before Cooper testified, for example, this AP story spun an email from Rove to Hadley as Rove trying to reel in the Plame leak, no doubt with kibbitzing from Rove's army of leakers.

Rove told then-deputy national security adviser Stephen Hadley in the July 11, 2003, e-mail that he had spoken with Time magazine reporter Matthew Cooper and tried to caution him away from some allegations that CIA operative Valerie Plame's husband was making about faulty Iraq intelligence.

"I didn't take the bait," Rove wrote in the message, disclosed to The Associated Press. In the memo, Rove recounted how Cooper tried to question him about whether President Bush had been hurt by the new allegations Plame's husband, former Ambassador Joseph Wilson, had been making.

The White House turned the e-mail over to prosecutors, and Rove told a grand jury about it last year during testimony in which he also acknowledged discussing Plame's covert work for the CIA with Cooper and syndicated columnist Robert Novak.

Then, just after Cooper testified, Rove or Libby's leakers started pushing a story about participating in discussions with George Tenet regarding his (false) mea culpa on the SOTU.

People who have been briefed on the case said the White House officials, Karl Rove and I. Lewis Libby, were helping prepare what became the administration's primary response to criticism that a flawed phrase about the nuclear materials in Africa had been in Mr. Bush's State of the Union address six months earlier.

They had exchanged e-mail correspondence and drafts of a proposed statement by George J. Tenet, then the director of central intelligence, to explain how the disputed wording had gotten into the address. Mr. Rove, the president's political strategist, and Mr. Libby, the chief of staff for Vice President Dick Cheney, coordinated their efforts with Stephen J. Hadley, then the deputy national security adviser, who was in turn consulting with Mr. Tenet.

At the same time, they were grappling with the fallout from an Op-Ed article on July 6, 2003, in The New York Times by Mr. Wilson, a former diplomat, in which he criticized the way the administration had used intelligence to support the claim in Mr. Bush's speech.

The work done by Mr. Rove and Mr. Libby on the Tenet statement during this intense period has not been previously disclosed. People who have been briefed on the case discussed this critical time period and the events surrounding it to demonstrate that Mr. Rove and Mr. Libby were not involved in an orchestrated scheme to discredit Mr. Wilson or disclose the undercover status of his wife, Valerie Wilson, but were intent on clarifying the use of intelligence in the president's address. Those people who have been briefed requested anonymity because prosecutors have asked them not to discuss matters under investigation.

The new story didn't work too well, though, because within a few days CIA sources (my guess is John McLaughlin) shot down this claim.

As part of this effort, then-deputy national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley spoke with Tenet during the week about clearing up CIA responsibility for the 16 words, even though both knew the agency did not think Iraq was seeking uranium from Niger, according to a person familiar with the conversation. Tenet was interviewed by prosecutors, but it is not clear whether he appeared before the grand jury, a former CIA official said.

On July 9, Tenet and top aides began to draft a statement over two days that ultimately said it was "a mistake" for the CIA to have permitted the 16 words about uranium to remain in Bush's speech. He said the information "did not rise to the level of certainty which should be required for presidential speeches, and the CIA should have ensured that it was removed."

A former senior CIA official said yesterday that Tenet's statement was drafted within the agency and was shown only to Hadley on July 10 to get White House input. Only a few minor changes were accepted before it was released on July 11, this former official said. He took issue with a New York Times report last week that said Rove and Vice President Cheney's chief of staff, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, had a role in Tenet's statement.

Here's what I think is going on with these leaks. There are emails between Rove and Libby and Hadley that suggest Hadley was involved in the conspiracy. They put out these leaks in July to cover up for them (and to cover up for details of Cooper's testimony). Which worked, so long as Hadley was able to limit more substantive investigations into his actions. I suspect that, in the same way they've been relying on conventions about journalistic privilege, they've also been relying on conventions about executive privilege to hide the tracks of their crime.

Did Rove and Libby try to cover up attempts to declassify information they later leaked?

Just speculation. Both Rove and one of Novak's sources talked about declassifying something to make their point. Novak says so in his original column [thanks to pollyusa for chasing down an active link to this].

The story, actually, is whether the administration deliberately ignored Wilson's advice, and that requires scrutinizing the CIA summary of what their envoy reported. The Agency never before has declassified that kind of information, but the White House would like it to do just that now -- in its and in the public's interest.

And Cooper says so in his grand jury testimony recap.

Rove told me material was going to be declassified in the coming days that would cast doubt on Wilson's mission and his findings.

Here's a wild-assed speculation. What if Rove and Libby tried to declassify something (I've believed it was intended to be the CIA recap of Wilson's trip, but perhaps they were going to release more than that) that week of July 6, but were turned down. Then, either because they had already released the info to Novak or just because they're obstinate motherfuckers, they went ahead and leaked the information from those documents anyway. If they had tried to convince Tenet to declassify such documents, there are likely emails to that effect between Rove and Hadley and Libby and Tenet. Which they might think they could explain away by pretending it had to do with other issues.

But which stories, if Rove has to testify fully about Hadley's involvement, probably won't stand up.

Comments

[sonofslothrop]

Thank you for doing so much heavy lifting on this story...

[Kagro X]

Here's something I thought about when I read yesterday's installment, and now jumps back out at me. It doesn't change the story line to date, but might be of importance in anticipating the outcomes we might see in the trial phase, if any:

Fitzgerald does not now know whether the "I learned it from a journalist" ruse has any basis in truth or not. He knows that there is more than one version of that story, but the basis in truth that those varying stories have is for a jury to decide.

While it's certainly true that juries tend to look askance at stories that are contradicted by multiple sources, it's a mistake to be conclusory about what is "known" from these contradictions. And should it come to trial, assuming that the established facts remain static from here on in, you will notice that Fitzgerald will be forced in his opening statements to say nothing more than that Rove will tell a story that will be contradicted by multiple witnesses. Anything more would be conclusory and objectionable as an opening.

Similarly, if Miller testified that she learned of Plame's identity from Libby, that doesn't necessarily establish that Rove's claim that he learned of Plame's identity from a journalist is false. It is evidence that there are remaining questions about Miller's veracity as well as Rove's. Which one is lying is also a finding for the jury. They may well conclude that it's Rove who's lying, but then again, there's good reason to believe they won't place a great deal of faith in Miller's testimony, either. After all, just like in all the cop shows, they'll learn that Miller cut a deal to get out of jail in exchange for her testimony.

Luckily, there are other witnesses who can also contradict Rove. But even though this is all just opinion and speculation -- something you've been more than clear about -- you might as well take advantage of the hedge that this is all persuasive evidence, but not necessarily proof. It might just save you a lot of headache later on, looking ahead to the trial phase, if there is one, in case the jury should somehow conclude that it's all the other witnesses who are lying, and not Rove.

[ScientistMom in NY]

Yes, thank you very much. I don't have anything of substance to contribute, but I'm reading every word of your posts with intense interest.

A random question; does a grand jury have to report every day? I assume Fitzgerald has needed to present evidence to them on relatively few of the days in the 18 months they've been impanelled. Are they allowed to go about their business for most of the time?

Also, if Fitzgerald gets an extension, will the same people serve for another 6 months?

And if there are indictments, will there be regular jury trials?

[Sara]

I think it highly possible that Hadley is a source regarding Plame's identity, and may well have been the source for both Libby and Rove.

Hadley was in the initial March Meeting where the Wilson Workup was initiated according to Wilson's book. Apparently he was at that meeting representing Condi, his then boss. I think we can assume Hadley would have both contributed information to the pot being assembled as part of the workup, and he would have had general access to the fruit of other's work.

There are also reasons to believe Hadley independently knew Valerie Wilson. He was the NSC Deputy responsible for WMD matters, and frequently was briefed by CIA officers -- and apparently there are several occassions when Valerie Plame Wilson went to the EOP with other officers working WMD to brief NSC staff. In this context, Hadley could well have known her.

The critical matter really is who took the basic information -- that Valerie was CIA and worked on WMD -- and reworked the story to one where the subject was nepotism, and that she had organized Joe Wilson's Niger trip? I suspect Hadley had the knowledge to do that, and his participation in the original work-up group given its motivations, would point to him as involved with changing the subject of the basic information. From what we know of Rove and Libby's statements to reporters, it seems clear they spouted the Nepotism story, and may not have known much about the way in which it was constructed. I rather suspect Hadley of being responsible for the construction -- as we know he was also probably responsible for keeping the 16 words in the SOTU, and possibly for the construction that the British were the source for the Niger Intelligence, avoiding the CIA doubts about the truth of the matter.

And since Condi was Hadley's boss at the time of these events -- we would also need to inquire into how she supervised his work. Were these misleading constructions done with her knowledge? Did she follow the progress of the "work-up" group? If so, what did she tell the President? I have a sense that information about a planned and ongoing conspiracy would not be covered by Executive Privilege.

[emptywheel]

Sara, I agree Hadley may be an important source. Don't forget David Shedd worked with Hadley at NSC, as likely a personal source of Plame's identity (and name) as Fleitz.

But I think the nepotism story almost certainly came to these guys honestly, by mistake. That is, simply because of what seems like an off-hand comment on the part of the INR analyst whose notes were used for the INR memo, that connection was made for them (perhaps with a little help from Bolton and Fleitz).

[kainah]

I agree that Hadley may be one of the key pivots. And let's not forget David Wurmser:

John Bolton was the neocons man at the State Dept - Arms Control, his senior aide was David Wurmser. Wurmser came from American Enterprise Institute, stopped at the Pentagon where he worked in the Office of Special Plans shop, and then moved to State. Wurmser is classic neocon in the truest sense of the word, and Bolton had made a point of putting his nose into INR, to the point that his assigned intel officer, Greg Thielmann was told he was no longer welcome at the staff meetings.

The investigation into the leak was officially announced in late September 2003, but it had been hinted in the press in early August that the CIA would ask for a formal probe.

David Wurmser moved to Cheney's office in September. He works under Lewis Libby as Cheney's ME expert.

That comes from the "timeline" narrative at My Little Sky. The timing certainly suggests that Wurmser might well have been taken into the VP's office to get a little executive privilege cover.

Which rasies a new question in my mind -- Does Bolton enjoy any type of heightened ambassadorial privileges now?

[Jeff]

I suspect Hadley was either Novak's first source (no partisan gunslinger) or the source for Pincus on July 12 whose info on Wilson's trip and Plame Pincus did not publish, not believing it true, but about whom he's written on several later occasions. Or maybe Hadley is the source for both.

Also, I have a suspicion that one dimension of this story we have not, to my knowledge, heard much about is that there was some confusion in the Bush administration between Wilson's 2002 trip to Niger and his 1999 trip. I don't have the time to track down all the relevant stuff at the moment, but I suspect this confusion is behind some of the patently confused things Ari Fleischer was saying during press gaggles or press conferences in Africa in July 2003, and therefore explains why Fitzgerald was interested in transcripts from those events. The reason this matters, of course, is because it is pretty suggestive that there was in fact some kind of work-up on and coordinated response to Wilson undertaken. It just wasn't done very well. It would also presumably build a stronger case concerning the release of classified information. There are a couple of bits about this evident confusion in Wilson's book too.

[kim]

Waas has a new article up, via warandpiece:

http://nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2005/1007nj3.htm

[kim]

New notes from Miller, via Talkingpointsmemo. I'm posting these links here as they've been popular topics, my comments about them probably wouldn't be too enlightening. I am impressed with everyone's precience:

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - New York Times reporter Judith Miller discovered notes from an earlier conversation she had with Vice President Dick Cheney's chief of staff and turned them over the prosecutor investigating the leak of a covert CIA operative's identity, legal sources said on Friday.

Miller's notes about a June 2003 conversation with Cheney's chief of staff, Lewis "Scooter" Libby, could be important to prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald's case by establishing exactly when Libby and other administration officials first started talking to reporters about CIA operative Valerie Plame and her diplomat husband, Joseph Wilson.

[coitdeck]

Am I correct . . .if Rove sent Hadley an email about his conversation with Cooper, erased it from his computer to cover his tracks, but had no way to know if Hadley would do the same,it would explain why he thought he might get away with lying to Fitz. He also may have erased it before the investigation and forgot about sending it to Hadley. My presumption has always been that the lower level guys wouldn't take a hit for Karl and lie to Fitz.

[bryan simmons]

And if Rove did pull that little move with his email to Hadley, it very well may get him an indictment for obstruction of justice and spoliation of evidence. Stressful days for Turd-Blossom...