The US is beyond hegemony AND exceptionalism--it must choose one

by emptywheel

I read with interest Michael Signer's account of the Truman Project's weekend meeting. "Finally," I thought, "an attempt to articulate a strong foreign policy in progressive terms." And bits of his account sound really great:

These six principles combine into the single center of gravity for Truman Democrats:  we believe in leadership, in inspiring the world community to follow us through our generosity, our values, and our accomplishments.

But when I read the details, I saw that they're still making what I consider to be the key mistake that Kerry and his really excellent collection of foreign policy experts made. They're still grasping to retain America's exceptionalism AND its real hegemonic power.

1)  American exceptionalism:  Like the neoconservatives, we believe that America is the greatest country the world has known.  We are historically, morally, and intellectually unique.  Unlike the necons, however, we believe we must constantly earn our exceptionalism through our moral conduct.  Our uniqueness stems from our values, and so we bear a unique responsibility for living up to those values in shaping and influencing the world.

[snip]

3)  American hegemony:  Like the neocons, we want America to retain its supremacy as the military, political , and economic leader of the world in order that we can maintain our own security, help strengthen the world's safety and stability,  and accomplish morally right goals.  We are and should be a unipolar power.  Unlike the neocons, however, we believe we must constantly earn and affirm the right to exercise that power.

Perhaps I'll be scolded for being a pessimist, but the time when the US could lead the rest of the world by appealing to our exceptionalism AND exert real hegemonic power is over. And the sooner the progressive community acknowledges that fact, the sooner we will begin to formulate a foreign policy that distinguishes us positively from the neocons ... and the sooner we begin to formulate a policy that is feasible.

Signer suggests one of the problem's with appealing to our exceptionalism: with Gitmo and Abu Ghraib and our demonstrably false case for war in Iraq, we have lost our claim to exceptionalism. Signer calls for real moral conduct in our foreign policy, which is necessary, but not sufficient to be able to be able to claim exceptionalism. We will need to do real penance before we can believably claim to lead the rest of the world in human rights or democracy.

But the bigger problem with attempting to retain both exceptionalism and hegemony is it ignores how we have exercised hegemony all these years and it ignores the real obstacles to retaining hegemony now.

We exercised hegemony after WWII through a combination of diplomatic (the UN) and economic (the Marshall Plan) means. At a time when we already had the rare advantage of combining size, agricultural riches, and technical know-how, we leveraged the economic devastation of our nearest competitors into a neat trade relationship. They bought our surpluses and helped us to bridge the period until our consumer economy had taken hold. And meanwhile, in the the UN, we could support a lot of policies that made us relatively stronger (such as pushing our allies to free their colonies) while allowing us to perpetuate the notion that we were democracy and freedom's evangelist.

In this period, we were able to sustain exceptionalism and hegemony because our exceptionalist ideas only served to increase our power relative to our rivals.

With the 1970s, the non-aligned movement and increasing numbers of post-colonial nations made the UN a tougher place to get things done. While the developing nations couldn't force anything through the UNSC, they could pressure the US in embarrassing ways (this is a major part of the UNESCO flap, the developing nations resisting US attempts to exercise hegemony through cultural and information means; the attempt was annoying enough that the US that it took its toys and went home and exerted cultural and informational influence through trade agreements instead). At the same time, the oil shocks and inflation more generally proved that we could be a vulnerable to commodity producers acting in concert. We were still the unquestionably greatest economy on earth, but we were showing real vulnerability.

So over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, we changed the foundation of our hegemonic influence, moving it away from the realm of representative discussion in the UN and into the realm of free trade. With free trade as the primary foundation of hegemony, we could pit developing nations against each other and undercut the power of most commodity producers (but not oil) by forcing new producers online, thereby flooding the market. Add in the dollar as the reserve currency, and we could sustain an otherwise unsustainable consumer lifestyle in the US that served as a carrot to persuade developing nations to enter trade agreements with us. So long as we got the greatest benefit from our trade deals, we would remain rich enough to build a military to equal the rest of the world's put together.

In this period, then, the terms of our exceptionalism changed. No longer were we the beacon of freedom and democracy, but instead we offered opportunity, development, and rewards for the best competitor.

But our hegemonic foundation is falling apart now. And the most logical thing we have to replace it--sheer military might--offers us no claim to exceptionalism.

Put aside the likelihood that the rest of the world will move away (pdf) from the dollar reserve system. Put aside arrival of Peak Oil, which will make our economy relatively less competitive than most other countries (with the exception of China, which is even less efficient than we are) and will make the consumer economy totally unsustainable. Put aside the fact that our deficit is so large that we will soon no longer be able to fund the military that keeps us hegemonic no matter what.

Put all of those issues aside and there's still a fundamental flaw to our hegemonic foundation. We can't compete anymore. We have told the rest of the world that the country with the most efficient economy will be the most powerful. All the while, we've been underfunding the investments we needed to stay the most efficient, things like our roads and broadband and education. And now we're in a position where our workers are competing against people who are as well-educated as Americans but are willing to work for a fraction of the pay. We're in a position where decades of protection (in agriculture, in automotive, in steel, and more) have made our industries flabby and uncompetitive. We can no longer compete by playing by the rules, the rules we ourselves wrote. Instead, the current Administration is resorting to desperate games to prop up the stock market by raiding the retirement accounts of our seniors, to change the rules to make it easier on our software or textile producers. To fight off attempts to make the rules more fair. To do things like invading resource-rich and strategically located countries.

The only way we're going to be able to retain our hegemonic position (barring some really drastic changes to our economy and society) is to cheat.

Which is why we can no longer enjoy the luxury of claiming exceptionalism for the very principles that allow us to exercise hegemony. We can't celebrate competition, because we can't compete. We can't celebrate democracy, really, because we need pliant governments to provide us advantageous terms for our commodity goods. We can't even celebrate the rule of law because we intend to break that law, whenever necessary.

The neocons, I believe, understand this. Currently, the neocons claim to retain both hegemony and an exceptionalism of freedom and democracy. But anyone who looks--even just at our coddling of Uzbekistan's dictator Karimov--should admit this is no more than show. (Arguably, the Neocons and their forebears were never serious about the exceptionalism part; but the Cold War gave us cover because it let us argue that capitalism was the same thing as democracy.) In fact, I suspect the realization that they can no longer sustain the claim of exceptionalism is part of the reason why the neocons seem so unperturbed by widespread evidence that we're torturing and disappearing people. They've made the decision they'll need to give up the exceptionalism; they just won't admit it until the Press forces them to, which doesn't appear to be coming any time soon.

The Neocons, at least, have recognized that they can no longer appeal to both exceptionalism AND maintain hegemony. They may try to pretend otherwise. But their actions suggest the appeal to exceptionalism is only a smokescreen.

Progressives, however, keep trying to have it both ways. I said this was a problem with Kerry. As an example, in all the discussion of making Iraq a multilateral venture, Kerry and his advisors never ceded the one thing that would have made it worthwhile for other countries to join in. They never ceded control of the oil or the military footprint. They wanted to turn Iraq into an exercise of democracy, but not if it meant giving up the strategy advantage that Bush had invaded Iraq in the first place to gain.

We're not going to be able to retain our hegemony under the guise of some exceptionalist project anymore. So Progressive, IMO, need to embrace the alternative. They can cede their insistence on hegemony and instead use the waning days of US power to set up a system that fulfills our exceptionalist ideals, is sustainable, and allows others to enjoy the fruits of this supposed ideal system.

There are a lot of reasons we should opt for exceptionalism over hegemony, not least because the globe is really too small to play hegemonic games anymore. But there is one more critical advantage to the alternative of ceding hegemony in favor of pursuing our ideals. One of the most intractable  challenges we will face in the foreign policy arena in the near future will never be solved so long as we pursue hegemony and refuse to accept cooperation: We will never find a solution to global warming so long as we are unwilling to give up the advantages of unfettered access to oil-based economy. We will never be able to retain hegemony and do the things needed to prevent major environmental catastrophe.

If we embrace America's exceptionalist principles and accept cooperation, progressives will be able to offer solutions to problems the neocons won't be able to address. And our solutions will offer a much better quality of life--to everyone involved--than the endless wars of the neocons.

Comments

[ogre]

Just... dang.

Athens. Syracuse. Hubris.

Cue Greek chorus.

[Meteor Blades]

Thought provoking and, I think, an excellent starting point for thinking about a future realistic foreign policy that can meet progressive expectations .

On one historical point, however, I'll have to take an ... er ... exception. U.S. policy in the American Hemisphere, since the time of the Monroe Doctrine, theoretically, but practically since the Teddy Roosevelt era, has not been tailored as a beacon of freedom and democracy plus hegemony. Sure, Batista, Pinochet, the Somoza dynasty, the Argentine generals, the Brazilian generals, the Peruvian generals, the Guatemalan generals didn't boil their foes in oil like Karimov, but they wouldn't have gained power or survived in power had it not been for a U.S. policy that generated hundreds of thousands of slaughtered civilians.

[praktike]

I must take exception with the history here. Surely the million or so US troops sitting in Western Europe and the other half-million occupying Japan had something to do with our predominance after WWII, yes? Let's not get too starry-eyed here. Power matters.

[RonK, Seattle]

Neocon exceptionalism still exists, but more in the mode of Manifest Destiny: assume we are going to win the world-game (because we want to, or because the other players are inept, or because God wants us to, or because we've been dealt a winning hand), and then find the stepping stones to this end-point.

[wd]

I think the formulation of a foreign policy that does not robotically assume, promote, and strive to maintain the mantles of exceptionalism and hegemony may make sense to people who think awful hard about these things (what is realistic, what's our reach and impact, etc), but will be seen as alien to a large majority of the American people. They'd ask why can't we be the shining city on the hill while protecting what is ours, even if it means meddlesome involvement with the rest of the world from time to time. As a foreign policy strategy, I agree that a reexamination of these two things you point to are in order...as an electoral strategy, it might be better to act as though there is never any doubt we can remain the city on the hill and keep a worldwide sphere of influence, whatever the reality, than to express doubts or second guess the current assumptions. Good post.

[al-Fubar]

American hegemony is - for the moment - a fact. Whether we exercise hegemonic power wisely or foolish, we have it ... for the moment. If we continue the policies of the Bush administration, the moment will be over pretty damn quickly. Ironically, any plausible set of progressive policies we might come up with here would have the effect of extending the sell-by date of American hegemony, by making it more sustainable.

American exceptionalism? I'm not so sure about that one. We've had a few high points, and a low one or two. I would settle for common sense leavened with some common decency.

-- Ric

[Abby]

Well I'd let both exceptionalism and hegemony go. I find the former kind of offensive even though my ancestors were part of the new Jerusalem project. The hegemony stuff doesn't really seem to be in our national interest, since as emptywheel points out, so many of our challenges--especially global warming, but there area others--will require cooperative solutions.

[emptywheel]

MB:

Yes, I was thinking of Pinochet specifically when I said the Neocons (well, their forebears) have ALWAYS only paid lip service to exceptionalism. But as I said, we got to SAY it was exceptionalism because we got to pretend capitalism was the same thing as democracy. The example is apt, since our behavior toward Chavez is a really good example of how our own claim to exceptionalism (democracy again) is preventing us from effecting some changes we woudl like right now. We might yet come to blows with Chavez (or have Uribe do it for us). But until then, we can't claim we're promoting democracy AND get rid of Chavez.

praktike-

Thanks for pointing that out. You're right that I ignored the military base of our power. In a longer post, I would have included that.

But my point is that we have always had an institution through which to exercise power (the UN, the WTO) that allowed us to claim exceptionalism while we were really using that exceptionalism to rule the world. The military was necessary for both of these institutions to work. But when discussing exceptionalism (and even the means to exercise hegemony), it is really a silent base.

wd

Yes, you raise a critical point. While we might be able to develop a more realistic foreign policy by recognizing the era of exceptionalism (or hegemony) is past, that's not going to get us elected President. I guess I'd just advocate beginning to prepare the people for the eventuality where we lose hegemony. I hope--and believe--that eventually Americans will opt for sustaining a reasonable quality of life (that is, dealing with global warming) over endless wars to retain our power. But no one NOW will believe they need to choose.

[No Preference]

emptywheel, I wish you did not move so gingerly in pointing out the obvious. The doctrine of US exceptionalism is a danger to the world. US global hegemony is a very fishy goal, as well as impossible except for the very short term. Everyone outside the US realizes this, as poll after international poll has shown.

As a Democrat I'm deeply, deeply ashamed that my party does not have the courage or vision to oppose the radical Republican world view of unending US global supremacy, which is both illegitimate and doomed to fail. I feel, as I did before the Iraq invasion, that I have nowhere to turn.

[Ben P]

Outstanding post. I had this some intellectual breakthrough last night in an exchange over at TPM. Here's some of my comments:

Liberalism is not imperialism, and hegemony is imperialism. Of course, I'm realistic about the degree to which the US can and can't be de facto imperialistic given the situation we currently find ourselves: and I'm not talking about the current Iraq War, but a series of policy decisions that goe back many, many years. Indeed, we need to be pragmatic as well as idealistic as liberals who wish to govern. However, I certainly don't think we should offer a policy program that makes as one of our goals hegemony (a euphemism for imperialism). Mideast democratization is great, and should be supported, even (and indeed most vehemently when) the outcome won't be "western style." The real problem the US has in the developing world (and indeed elsewhere) is that it wants to claim it is an exceptional nation whose motives are pure while at the same time acting exactly like every other great power imperial hegemon has ever acted. The hypocrisy is bleedingly obvious to everyone outside our borders: if you want to know "why they hate us," your answer lies here. A liberal foreign policy must start from a less craven, more idealistic, more creative point than this. Or at the very least, it should have to recognize that these two aspirations - exceptionalism and hegemony - are in a zero-sum relationship to one another.

[Ben P]

Praktike - good point. I would say the context in which US troops were allowed inside Europe were very different - for obvious cultural, military, and historic reasons. I think the differences between Iraq and Japan are perhaps not as obvious, but I think the military circumstances were very different. After all, we didn't fight a war with Japan to turn it into a democracy: we fought it because they attacked us, they represented a major threat to us, we fought a long and brutal war with them, etc..

Clearly, Korea worked out with a long term occupation, and Vietnam was a disaster and essentially the end of the era when exceptionalism and hegemony could plausibly. But, what's more, I think both of these conflicts had a greater moral justification than Iraq. OK, Diem was a joke, but S. Vietnam. For whom are we fighting this war, really?

I've seen arguments advanced that somehow the rules of international relations and warfare were radically changed by 9/11. But these arguments rest on national security arguments, not the reasons Bush is advancing.

I've said this for a long time, but if you want an analogy to what Iraq is going to become, your best models to analyze would be early 20th century Phillipines or Cuba.

Ben P

[Ben P]

Ahh. Typos.

"could plausibly coexist" - ie era of high hegemony between 45 and 70.

"S. Vietnam" at least had a government who wanted defending, no matter how unrepresentative and corrupt.

Clearly, our intervention in Korea has been vindicated, because the S Korea government was a victim of aggression, and the people who lived under it accorded it a good degree of legitimacy, which clearly was much less the case in Vietnam.

[Ben P]

I generally heartily enjoy the choice you want to make, ew. As a liberal, how could one seriously consider the other? We already have a hegemony party after all.

In other words, I believe that America can be exceptional exceptional, but in the sense the founding fathers imagined it, and generally how American statesman imagined the nation until quite recently - including the much misquoted and misunderstood Woodrow Wilson: that it does not play the typical great power games or indulge in tribalistic nationalism.

We're not exceptionalism simply because we say we are: we are because of what we do and the principles we adhere to. Somewhere since World War II, this important distinction has been lost, and exceptionalism has just become a warmed over (and hypocritical) justification for anything our state chooses to do. And as such, America becomes exactly the same as any other nation, at least on the international stage. If one wants to be exceptional, one cannot also claim to be a hegemon. Thats the same game that China, Britain, France, Russia, the Soviet Union, et al.. played.

[Ben P]

The Latin American situation is very interesting, what with events in Bolivia unfolding, and Mexico looking likely to follow its Southern cousins next year.

Is there any government left in the hemisphere that isn't "left," "hard" or otherwise? I guess one of the advantages for Latin America about our current mideast fixation is that they don't have to worry about as much meddling as during the Cold War.

The Chavez example is pretty hypocritical on the US's part. I have no real illusions about the guy, but I don't think he's a Castro clone either. The guy is clearly popular in Venezuela, because at least he's trying to fix problems that the US-centric elites have done so little to address. Whether he succeeds or not is an open question: but the fact he is popular to begin with should maybe open a few eyes inside the Beltway.

[Ben P]

The Latin American situation is very interesting, what with events in Bolivia unfolding, and Mexico looking likely to follow its Southern cousins next year.

Is there any government left in the hemisphere that isn't "left," "hard" or otherwise? I guess one of the advantages for Latin America about our current mideast fixation is that they don't have to worry about as much meddling as during the Cold War.

The Chavez example is pretty hypocritical on the US's part. I have no real illusions about the guy, but I don't think he's a Castro clone either. The guy is clearly popular in Venezuela, because at least he's trying to fix problems that the US-centric elites have done so little to address. Whether he succeeds or not is an open question: but the fact he is popular to begin with should maybe open a few eyes inside the Beltway.

[emptywheel]

Ben P,

Don't forget Uribe, in whose country we have hundreds, probably thousands, of military advisors and contractors. So, yeah, there is an exception to the Latin American trend. And the US no doubt intends to protect Uribe and Colombia as a military foothold in case we ever do feel the need to go after Chavez.