By DHinMI
Hearing this morning that Osama bin Laden had issued another
audiotape offering a “truce,” this time with the United States, I figured I’d
be late to the game, that most of the bloggers would have already parsed and
analyzed the meaning and significance of bin Laden’s message, and that what I
wanted to say would be old and stale. But to my surprise, a quick tour of the some of the blogs most likely to
have covered the speech showed very little interest. Maybe bin Laden and al Qaeda messages are becoming like the Tom
Ridge rainbow of terror warnings, or the 25th launch of the Space
Shuttle; something that doesn’t capture our attention they way it used to, at
least not until something spectacular happens.
In his message, bin Laden not only proposes a truce with the
U.S., he also says that al Qaeda is preparing terror strikes within the
U.S. Its likely that most analyses
you’ll see of this message will focus on the conflict between al Qaeda and the
United States. It’s also been proposed
that the message, coming days after the attempt to assassinate Ayhman
al-Zawahiri, is to reassure jihadis that the senior figures of al Qaeda are
still alive, which is plausible but complicated by the fact that some reports
claim that the tape has been dated to December, weeks prior to the attempt on
Zawahiri’s life. But there’s another
(not necessarily exclusive) reason why bin Laden may have issued the message, which includes a statement on the importance of rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan:
al Qaeda may be loosing support in Iraq, and he may be trying to regain control
of al Qaeda in Iraq.
One of the least discussed dynamics in Iraq is the apparent
ideological and strategic rift between Al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi and the bin Laden/Zawahiri-led al Qaeda “establishment.” Almost
a year ago Zarqawi began advocating exapanding operations
in Iraq to fighting Shiites and inciting sectarian war between Iraq’s Sunni and
Shiites. As al Qaeda’s Robespierre,
he’s does not appear constrained by tactical or strategic prudence, which prompted
Zawahiri to urge him to stop the beheadings and intentionally targeting
civilians.
Zarqawi ignored Zawahiri’s advice. Zarqawi may be making progress in inciting civil war between
Iraq’s Sunni and Shiites, and his stature may be greater among Islamist
political fundamentalists outside Iraq, but within Iraq his methods are hurting
any effort to foster wider appeal among Iraqis, and fueling conflict between
the indigenous Iraqi insurgency and the Jihadis. As the NYT reported last week, fighting between in the Sunni
Triangle between the indigenous insurgents and the Jihadis has increased in
recent months, and Iraqis have begun to turn against the Jihadis as interlopers
with no regard for Iraqi tribal and nationalistic traditions and concerns. Last week outgoing commander of coalition
forces in Iraq Lt. General John Vines also said al Queda in Iraq was in
“disarray.”
So among whatever other reasons may have prompted this
message from bin Laden, it’s worth considering that it’s an olive branch to
Iraqis increasingly alienated by the aims and methods of those in Iraq who are
acting in the name of al Qaeda. Furthermore, it may be a sign that the global Jihadi movement may be
entering a new phase, where the Egyptian and Egyptian-inspired ideological
descendents of the Muslim Brotherhood give way—through death, incarceration,
and rejection by the even more extreme elements of the Jihadi movement—to the
ideological crude brethren of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. This could be an attempt by bin Laden to stave off the transfer
of power and influence and inspiration from him to Zarqawi, which could roughly
be like the shift of influence from Lenin to Stalin. At the same time, it may reflect concern that Zarqawi is screwing
up the image of al Qaeda in Iraq, with possible negative repercussions through
all Muslim societies. To use a bit of
corporate phraseology, it may be as if bin Laden is trying to rescue his brand’s
name from the poor care given it by franchisees like Zarqawi.
I hope some of these questions are being pondered by the
experts in terrorism and foreign policy, because it would obviously be better
to understand bin Laden than just mindlessly react to his public
statements. Even better would be if
someone in the Bush administration listens to anyone who takes seriously the
internal dynamics and possible struggles for power and influence in Al
Qaeda. Such attention to the workings
of al Qaeda may even lead to a more effective policy against this global
terrorist movement by the Bush administration, which would benefit us all.