The INR Memos Were Part of the Niger Forgery Cover-Up

by emptywheel

I was not very coherent yesterday in my discussion of the INR memo posted by the NY Sun. So at the risk of letting my obsessions get the better of me, I'd like to try again on one point. The Sun posted two versions of the INR memo, and a comparison of them with the SSCI report reveals that the INR memo was complicit in covering up how someone at State squelched the debunking of the Niger forgeries.

I base this on the following logic:

1. The Sun attempted to reveal just one of the INR memos, thereby hiding the redaction of mentions of an INR staff member
2. The INR staff member is almost certainly the Iraq nuclear analyst
3. The Iraq nuclear analyst is the guy who debunked the Niger forgeries as soon as they reached State in October 2002 ... but who seemingly disappeared for three months thereafter

While the INR memos don't tell how the Iraq nuclear analyst's input was suppressed, they strongly support the contention that someone at State was trying to cover-up State's involvement with the Niger forgeries.

There are three files I'll be discussing here:

• The June 10 INR memo, with the (presumably) declassification cover letter and the INR analyst notes attached
• The July 7 INR memo
• The (presumably) declassification cover letter for the July 7 memo

Correction 4/19: After reading this comment from &y, I realized that the distribution list on the cover letter for the July 7 document--S, D, P, PA--refers to the people who received the memo on July 7: Powell (Secretary), Armitage (Deputy), Grossman (Political Affairs), and Boucher (Public Affairs). Which means I'm almost certainly wrong about these being declassification memos. They're the original cover letters. But that means that Carl Ford didn't sign off on either of these (which might explain the initials). And that William Wood is the one who signed off on the altered July 7 version. Which raises new questions--what role did Carl Ford have in these documents? And when did the alteration occur, and who made that alteration? I guess that's why Fitzgerald asked so many questions of those in State about the production of this memo...

Taken together, the two versions of the memos and the declassification cover letters show four differences between the memos:

• Someone besides Carl Ford obviously initialed one memo
• The memos were declassified at different times (and both at least 5 months ago)
• The memos were declassified by different people
• The June 10 memo includes the following passage:

What follows is based on our paper and electronic files: we are confident that these records and the recollections of person involved at the margin are basically accurate but the two INR staff members who were most involved are not here (one has been reassigned to REDACTED other is on leave) to guide us through the files and emails.

While the July 7 rewrites that passage (in the electronic file--this is more than redaction) to read (I've bolded the differences in both passages):

What follows is based on our paper and electronic files: we are confident that these records and the recollections of person involved at the margin are basically accurate but one INR staff member who was most involved is not here (he has been reassigned to REDACTED to guide us through the files and emails.

In other words, the July 7 removes all mention of a staff person who was central to the questions at hand, the dispute between WH and State over the Niger uranium intelligence. (Curiously, this detail is never included in accounts of Carl Ford printing out the memo and delivering it to Powell; did Ford remove the mention of the second staffer, or did someone else?)

Here is some background explanation on the first three bullets:

I'm guessing that Thomas Fingar, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of INR, initialed the June 10 one, but that's a wild-arsed guess from reading the chicken scratch. I base that solely on the fact that the other initial includes an obvious "C", whereas this one appears to start with something other than a "C" in the first initial. In his Bolton testimony, Fingar said that Carl Ford was having health problems and was frequently absent, so it would not be implausible that Fingar signed off on his superior's memo in his absence.

I say the memos were declassified at different times because the PDAS (Deputy Assistant Secretary of INR) listed in the declassification memo is different in each. Thomas Fingar, who approved the June 10 declassification, was PDAS from before the time the memo was written until July 2004 (Fingar went on to become the Assistant Secretary of INR and is now the Chair of the National Intelligence Council). William Wood, listed as the PDAS on the declassification memo for the July 7 document, became PDAS sometime after November 2004, but has since left INR. Additionally, Neil Silver left the position of Director of INR/SPM sometime year.

In other words, if these are in fact declassification memos, the June 10 memo was declassified some time between June 10, 2003 and July 2004 (not incidentally the development period of the SSCI report). Whereas the July 7 memo (the memo the Sun meant to give us) was declassified sometime between November 2004 and roughly December 2005. (I could be wrong about this last date, but I'm fairly certain when I was working on this December post, Silver had already been replaced by Douglas Spelman). These memos appear to have been declassified for months--the June 10 one at least 20 months and the July 7 one at least 5 months.

Update: Fixed the date--Silver left before December; I'm not sure about earlier.

So why haven't we seen these documents? First, let me explain the last bullet, the removal of (I believe) a mention referencing the INR Iraq nuclear analyst.

The INR Staff Member on leave is almost certainly the Iraq nuclear analyst

One thing the Sun (incompetently) tried to do was publish the July 7, but not the June 10, INR memo.  That is either because they wanted to hide the earlier declassification of the document. Or because they wanted to hide the involvement (or lack thereof) of the INR Iraq nuclear analyst. (Or both.)

I'm almost certain the INR Iraq nuclear analyst is the INR staff member redacted in the July 7 version of the memo. The following lists each paragraph of the non-redacted portions of the memo, with the State Department personnel it mentions (note that NP, Non-Proliferation, is a sub-section of then-Bolton's and now Joseph's department; it is not a part of INR).

Paragraph 1: Summary
Paragraph 2: Douglas Rohn
Paragraph 3: No State personnel listed
Paragraph 4: INR NIE dissent noted
Paragraph 5: NP mentioned wrt the forgeries, as well as the reference:

These documents ... were not adequately analyzed until much later and were judged to be fraudulent.

Paragraph 6: NP releases fact sheet, as well as this reference:

On January 12, 2003, INR "expressed concerns to the CIA that the documents pertaining to the Iraq-Niger deal were forgeries." The conclusion may, however, have been reached and communicated for the first time somewhat earlier: the record is not clear on this point.

Paragraph 7: The reference:

There is no indication, however, that anyone in INR met with Ambassador Wilson except at the February 19, 2002 meeting hosted by CIA, or discussed his trip and what he learned with anyone in the Department of at CIA.

That is, the only INR staff members mentioned, except for Douglas Rohn, are involved in the NIE dissent and the refutation of the forgeries with State.

Now let's look closer at who these unnamed people might be.

Paragraph 4 mentions the NIE and, by default, those INR staff members involved in the creation of the NIE. The SSCI report provides these details about INR personnel involved in the NIE:

At the NIE coordination meeting, the only analyst who voiced disagreement with the uranium section was an INR analyst.

[snip]

When someone, the NIO was not sure who, suggested that the uranium information be included as another sign of reconstitution, the INR Iraq nuclear analyst spoke up and said that he did not agree with the uranium reporting and that INR would be including text indicating their disagreement in their footnote on nuclear reconstitution.

[snip]

Because INR disagreed with much of the nuclear section of the NIE, it decided to convey its alternative views in text boxes, rather than object to every point throughout the NIE. INR prepared two separate boxes, one for the key judgments section and a two page box for the body of the nuclear section, which included a sentence which stated that "the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious."

[snip]

Both the NIO for Strategic and Nuclear Programs and the INR's senior WMD analyst told Committee staff that INR's dissent on the uranium reporting was inadvertently separated from the reconstitution section and included in the aluminum tubes box in the annex of the NIE. [my emphasis]

So the two INR staff members mentioned in the NIE passage are the Iraq nuclear analyst and the senior WMD analyst.

Paragraph 6 refers to mid-January communication that the Niger forgeries were BS. The SSCI report provides these details about a similar communication (though there is a discrepancy with the date).

On January 13, 2003, the INR Iraq nuclear analyst sent an e-mail to several IC analysts outlining his reasoning why, "the uranium purchase agreement probably is a hoax." He indicated that one of the documents that purported to be an agreement for a joint military campaign, including both Iraq and Iran, was so ridiculous that it was "clearly a forgery." Because this document had the same alleged stamps for the Nigerien Embassy in Rome as the uranium documents, the analyst concluded "that the uranium purchase agreement probably is a forgery." When the CIA analyst received the e-mail, he realized that WINPAC did not have copies of the documents and requested copies from INR. CIA received copies of the foreign language documents on January 16, 2003. [my emphasis]

Unless the January 12 communication was entirely different from the email sent on January 13 arguing the same thing, the Iraq nuclear analyst is the INR staff member mentioned in Paragraph 6, as well.

Now look at the non-mention of an INR staff member in Paragraph 5.

These documents ... were not adequately analyzed until much later and were judged to be fraudulent.

Again from the SSCI report, we learn:

(U) Immediately after receiving the documents, the INR Iraq nuclear analyst e-mailed IC colleagues offering to provide the documents at a previously planned meeting of the Nuclear Interdiction Action Group (NIAG) the following day. The analyst, apparently already suspicious of the validity of the documents noted in his e-mail, "you'll note that it bears a funky Emb. of Niger stamp (to make it look official, I guess)."

(U) The INR Iraq nuclear analyst told Committee staff that the thing that stood out immediately about the documents was that a companion document - a document included with the Niger documents that did not relate to uranium - mentioned some type of military campaign against major world powers. The members of the alleged military campaign included both Iraq and Iran, and was, according to the documents, being orchestrated through the Nigerien Embassy in Rome, which all struck the analyst as "completely implausible." Because the stamp on this document matched the stamp on the uranium document, the analyst thought that all of the documents were likely suspect. The analyst was unaware at the time of any formatting problems with the documents or inconsistencies with the names or dates.

(U) On October 16, 2002, INR made copies of the documents available at the NIAG meeting for attendees, including representatives from the CIA, DIA, DOE and NSA. Because the analyst who offered to provide the documents was on leave, the office's senior analyst provided the documents. She cannot recall how she made the documents available, but analysts from several agencies, including the DIA, NSA and DOE, did pick up copies at that meeting. None of the four CIA representatives recall picking up the documents, however, during the CIA Inspector General's investigation of this issue, copies of the documents were found in the DO's CPD vault. It appears that a CPD representative did pick up the documents at the NIAG meeting, but after returning to the office, filed them without any further distribution. [my emphasis]

Not only do we learn the forgeries were immediately judged to be fraudulent (contrary to the claims of the INR memo), but we learn the Iraq nuclear analyst is the one who made that analysis.

When we compare the INR memo with the SSCI report, it becomes clear that the INR staff member "most involved" in the events described--even more so than Douglas Rohn, then the West African analyst--is the Iraq nuclear analyst. The only other possible candidates to be the redacted person are the "senior analyst" in the Iraq nuclear analyst's office or the "senior WMD analyst" referenced wrt the NIE. But the "senior analyst" is Beth Frisa, proliferation division chief. And the "senior WMD analyst" is either Neil Silver or Beth Frisa. In short, the only other candidates who could be this redacted staff member are people who signed off on the document, and therefore were almost certainly not on leave.

Also note the areas where mention of the Iraq nuclear analyst has been suppressed all relate to areas that remain vague or under dispute. The memo puts the date when the Niger forgeries were analyzed as a vague "much later."  Then it admits:

The conclusion [that the Niger forgeries were forgeries] may, however, have been reached and communicated for the first time somewhat earlier; the record is not clear on this point.

The June 10 memo mentions the second INR staff member to explain some of the vagueness related to the content of the memo. We can clearly see how the absence of the Iraq nuclear analyst would prevent INR from solidly fixing the date when the Niger forgeries were debunked ... which we know (and Beth Frisa, who signed off on the memo, must have known) happened in October 2002.

Because the INR Iraq nuclear analyst was not involved in the production of the INR memo, it was possible to portray the debunking of the Niger forgeries as occurring three months later than that debunking actually happened.

(Interestingly, we could probably make a parallel argument about the absence of Douglas Rohn; had he been present, he probably could have clarified the what he meant by his references to Valerie Plame.)

So what do I think happened?

First let me rehearse the probably chronology traced above. In May, Libby asked Marc Grossman to find out more about the Joe Wilson trip (interesting that he make that request of someone at State, rather than someone at CIA). Carl Ford (or, perhaps, Thomas Fingar) asks Neil Silver to develop that memo. Silver relies on Douglas Rohn's notes (since Rohn has recently been reassigned to Pakistan). And, because the Iraq nuclear analyst is on leave, Silver can't fill in some of the critical details about the Niger forgeries.

Using the knowledge summarized in the INR memo, Marc Grossman briefs a group at the White House about its contents.

Then, a month later, when Wilson publishes his op-ed, Richard Armitage has Carl Ford recreate the memo for Colin Powell's consumption. Perhaps the INR analyst is no longer on leave. Perhaps he's still on leave but someone else wants to remove all mention of him. But for some reason, even this shred of evidence about the inaccuracy surrounding the Niger forgery is removed.

Sometime in the following several months--probably as part of the SSCI inquiry--the June 10 memo is declassified. (Though the CIA claimed in December 2003 that the INR memo was still classified.)

Then, sometime after the Presidential election, the second INR memo is declassified (perhaps this was a response to Jane Harman's request for both copies of the INR memo). But the two copies are not shown together--at least not intentionally.

Beyond this chronology, I can't yet offer much explanation for the shenanigans with this memo. But I will repeat an observation I made yesterday. Two of the five major things redacted in the declassification process (which had to have happened while Bolton was still at State) serve to hide Bolton's department's involvement in propagating the Niger claims, including accepting the Niger forgeries from SISMI.

This stinks. It stinks to high hell.

Update, 4/19:

I'm a little closer to providing a solid reason why this is very suspicious.

The INR memos reference a substantial body of evidence, including some evidence that differs from CIA's depiction of the events (particularly, it seems, how Powell came to reject the uranium claims). They say:

Our records contain an extensive paper and electronic trail on the Niger/Iraq allegations, including other retrospective accounts differing somewhat from the CIA retrospective mentioned above.

They're basically saying they have reviewed all the available evidence.

But no mention of the Iraq nuclear analyst's October 15 email, questioning the forgeries. That omission, plus the comment that he is on leave so he can't "guide us through the files and emails" gives them plausible deniability. ("Oops, sorry we didn't notice the Niger forgeries were debunked in October 2002, early enough to prevent the war resolution! The INR analyst wasn't here!") But it's disingenuous. The email is pretty clear--at least as reported by the SSCI--that he doubted the authenticity of the forgeries. They've basically removed clear evidence that State doubted the forgeries back in October.

Comments

[emptywheel]

FWIW

I'm not sure I've completely proven my case. it's possible that the Iraq nuclear analyst just happened to be on leave (unexpectedly) on the day he would have told the rest of the IC the Niger forgeries were forgeries. And it's possible that he was again on leave (expectedly or not) at the time when he could make the case that he had debunked the Niger forgeries earlier than Bush let on. And it's possible that Ford just removed all mention of him in July 2003 because he was back at work, but Ford didn't want to go to the trouble to edit the memo to reflect the Iraq nuclear analyst's input.

But there are a whole lot of coincidences associated with this memo. Like I said, it stinks to high hell.

[windansea]

empty...bet you read this first!!

one interesting diference between the two versions...The June 10 one (first paragraph) states that the two INR staff members most familiar with all the files etc were not present to help (one reassigned and one on leave)

The July version just mentions the one who has been reassigned

It seems this memo has a lot of CYA in it...lots of "we think this is accurate but" and the writer definitely seeks to keep all things Jow Wilson at a distance

Posted by: windansea | April 17, 2006 at 01:43 PM

http://justoneminute.typepad.com/main/2006/04/widen_the_net.html#comments

[William Ockham]

Or she might have read my comment (the first one posted to her original blog entry about the memos). Or she might have simply come to the conclusion on her own by comparing the two memos side-by-side like anybody else with an above 3rd grade reading ability would have. Sheesh, get over yourself.

[emptywheel]

FWIW2

I owe the observation entirely to William. I also owe him for clearing my head on the fact that we were looking at two memos. That's when I started blubbering, because I realized what they had taken out. And it all went downhill from there.

Thanks again William!

[windansea]

william...don 't be such a pill....I saw your original post...compared the two versions like any 3rd grader would...and posted it first!!

speaking of getting over yourself...you alluded to super secret hacking ability to get that 2nd version...you are starting to sound like Wilson

[MK]

Thanks for the analysis. You are amazing.
I awoke this morning with questions about how these memos came to surface now -- and especially how they arrived in the NYSun's inbox along with Luskin's spin, so intertwined that the Sun story spins both together.
On Friday, Judge Walton will hear arguments about a gag order -- would that apply to Luskin? Is this a before-the-bell attempt to get these artfully redacted memos out there in a positive-to-Libby/Rove/etc. light before the gag order? (And I was bemused and amazed at John Dickerson's piece in Slate yesterday arguing that people should contribute to the Libby defense fund because it is the one way we are finding out what's going on in the Bush administration. Sounded like just too Rovian a double-carom shot to be believed.)

[&y]

As a taxpayer, I find it strange that an intelligence memo like this might contain gaps because so-and-so was on leave or had been reassigned. Come on. We sent a former ambassador all the way to Niamey to gather intelligence, but current employees who were involved in debriefing him are somehow unreachable when it's time to draft a summary memo? It's a minor thing, but it strikes me is ridiculous.

Maybe the redacted portion reads, "reassigned to THE SPACE STATION" and "on leave" is secret code for, "he's in a coma right now."

[windansea]

MK

the Sun got the memos through a FOIA request...if you can find someone who requested them earlier than the Sun then let us know...so far i haven't seen anyone whin ing about it

[mk]

Well, I knew they placed a FOIA request a long time ago.
But it just seems odd to me that their request would get answered right now, especially as EW points out these documents were declassified a long time ago.
It's not the timing of the request but the timing of the release that seems strange.

[emptywheel]

I'm not suggesting the Sun sat on this for this long. I think it likely that the first declassification coincided with the SSCI (the memo and notes, which were quoted at some length in the SSCI, would have had to been vetted by INR, particularly given the ORCON classification). And I'm not sure if Jane Harman has shared the two versions of memos with anyone else; but if she has, then presumably the second memo would have had to be declassified at that point (though I presume that Harman, as one of the group of 8, has the clearance to read the memos).

So it wouldn't require a news outlet to have sat on these at all. The earlier declassification might simply reflect the earlier investigations of these memos.

[emptywheel]

Though, of course, the Sun decided to publish only the least incriminating part of this document.

I've also been thinking back to the Judicial Watch FOIA that got the earlier report on Niger and uranium. They also got a bunch of other documents at the time, but have not published them at all.

In other words, we've got two conservative outlets sitting on documents. And in the case of the Sun, we know it's sitting on documents that are damned incriminating.

[MK]

No, I didn't mean the Sun sat on them either.
My thought was that they were being released by the administration at this time for a political reason. It wouldn't be the first time this has happened.
If Libby's case is that CIA and State and others were fighting a pitched battle about the whole intelligence leading up to war, well, I think these memos indicate that there was some sniping going on between agencies -- especially as they seem to be artfully redacted (and also artfully written in the first place).

[orionATL]

E'wheel

your post yesterday was not a loss, at least to me.

you drew attention to one of my favorite arguments against the likelihood of there actually having been a uranium deal between niger and iraq in the 1990's,

to whit,

the "physical reality" argument,

which i would summarize thusly:

1)iraq was under u.n. sanctions

2) it experienced american fly-overs

3) american, russian, and european spy satellites can probably read the headlines on the newspaper i leave on my patio

4)niger was a francophone african nation in which not a gourd is picked without the french intelligence knowing of it

5)a french consortium manges the uranium mining in niger

so

how the hell could anyone ship 500 tons of ore from niger to iraq and not have some aspect of that operation noticed?

you don't dig yellowcake by hand, i assume

you don't transport it by camel, i assume.

in short there have to be big machines involved.

hmm.

how to get around this if your are OVP?

ah,yes.

shortly, a set of documents from the nigerian embassy in rome, discovered by accident in AEI file cabinets, will conclusively suggest the existence of an underground tunnel from basra to niamey.

of course, none of this "physical reality" business can prove or disapprove that there was a uranium agreement,

but

wouldn't it have been a good starting place from a reporter to begin challenging the white house assertions in 2003?

in any event,

i very much appreciate your efforts to keep your readers up on niger/plame

and all its spin-offs.

taken collectively,

your posts and the comments that have accompanied them

are a a model of meticulous internet detective work -

the power of human "parallel processing" in the weblog world.

[Rayne]

Great job, EW, as always.

[Tortoise]

Pakistan. Yes, 8 letters, fits in the spaces (love it when they use a fixed-space font).
"... reassigned to Pakistan)..." (June 10),
or "...Pakistan, ..." (July 7),
and "... (now in Pakistan) ..." (both versions).

Seems silly to redact something that can be figured out so easily. Or am I missing something?

[William Ockham]

windansea,

I apologize for coming across as a bit snippy. I'm more than willing to credit you with being the first one to notice that difference. I just felt that it was a mistake on your part to assume that folks on this site read through the comments on Tom Maguire's site (excepting, of course, Jeff who really does yeoman's work in that regard).

I certainly didn't intend to make my locating the other document on the New York Sun's site sound like cloak and dagger. That sort of thing is actually quite mundane in my day job, but it sometimes seems like magic to less experienced users. When you understand the technology behind maintaining a large web site, predicting the pattern of a missing link is quite easy.

As for sounding like Wilson, I'll take that as a compliment. It often takes a little bombast to get people to pay attention to the truth. I know it's not a popular view on Maguire's site, but I happen to think that Joseph Wilson, for all his human foibles, performed this country a great service.

[emptywheel]

Tortoise:

It didn't take forensics. 2Lucky found the Pakistan reference using old-fashioned Google.

Makes it even sillier to redact, huh? Although remember--this redaction probably happened in early 2004, at which time it may have been a different issue.

[emptywheel]

And one more point--it wouldn't be so easy to figure out where he is now if it weren't for the Sun providing his name. Don't know where or why they got his name, though...

[Squeaky]

ew-One major difference between the two memos is that the July 7th version changed Valerie Wilson to Valerie Plame. Either that was redacted (can't imagine why) in the Sun's version or the Sun's version is not the one that was on AF One.
The name was changed to Plame in the second memo so as to make sure that her NOC cover name was known to all.

[Squeaky]

ew-One major difference between the two memos is that the July 7th version changed Valerie Wilson to Valerie Plame. Either that was redacted (can't imagine why) in the Sun's version or the Sun's version is not the one that was on AF One.
The name was changed to Plame in the second memo so as to make sure that her NOC cover name was known to all.

[emptywheel]

Squeaky

Do you have any evidence for that? I've never seen any allegation that the INR memo on AF1 had a reference to Plame--and I just re-read every major INR memo article last night.

[squeaky]

ew-I was hoping that you wouldn't ask that. I will dig through my chaotic notes and saved docs. I will find it eventually, as the source is somewhere on my computer.

[windansea]

william...accepted...I was just joking about empty reading my post yesterday at JOM...like you said..anyone could see those diferences in the memos

re Joe...think what you like but why do you think Kerry dropped him like a hot potato?

[orionATL]

so what is the provenance of these two documents re: the sun having them in its custody?

are they "official" documents,

i.e., obtained thru foi or court filings

or

were they leaked to the sun,

perhaps before they were declassified,

which might explain why the sun sat on them.

did the sun do the redactions?

are declassified documents still subject to such heavy editing by declassifying govt officials?

is this another leak of political convenience rather than conscience?

[Tortoise]

EW - Rohn's name is handwritten on the page of notes from the 2/19 meeting, top right. Its possible that somebody at the Sun wrote it, but maybe it was there when the Sun obtained the copies - which could explain how they found the name so easily. I wish I could decipher the word that is struck out just ahead of "Rohn".